Board structure, corporate governance and firm value: evidence from Hong Kong

Lei, Adrian C. H.; Song, Frank M.

doi:10.1080/09603107.2011.650329

Cited by 40 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Our main firm performance variable is Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q as a firm performance measure is widely used in the existing CG literature (see, e.g., Demsetz & Lehn, 1985;Hiraki, Inoue, Ito, Kuroki, & Masuda, 2002;Gompers et al, 2003). This measure is forward-looking and thus does not suffer from problems that arise from other accounting performance measures such as the effects of business cycles (Lei & Song, 2012). It is also less affected by accounting conventions and by the documented strategic manipulation of earnings (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996).…”

Section: Dependent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance and firm performance relationship: Implications for risk‐adjusted return behavior

Dash

Raithatha

2019

Manage Decis Econ

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We examine the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and stock return behavior using panel data for Indian listed firms for 2006 to 2015. Our results suggest that corporate governance improves firm performance. However, corporate governance information fails to provide excess risk‐adjusted returns to investors, as governance information is well assimilated in prevailing stock prices. In addition to extending the scant literature focused on emerging markets, our findings will prove useful to investors, fund managers, and rating agencies in making investment decisions and regulators in assessing the impact of governance norms.

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Section: Dependent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance and firm performance relationship: Implications for risk‐adjusted return behavior

Dash

Raithatha

2019

Manage Decis Econ

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“…To build country governance indices, we rely on nonpublic data from firm surveys that were conducted in Brazil (2004), India (2006, and 2012), and Korea (1998-2004, and public data hand-collected from firm annual reports in Turkey (2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012). This data collection effort greatly improves data quality compared to publicly available data or commercial surveys , but also limits sample size and available years.…”

Section: Sample Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance indices and construct validity

Black

Carvalho

Khanna

et al. 2017

Corporate Governance

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Manuscript Type: Conceptual and empirical.Research Question/Issue: Many studies of firm-level corporate governance rely on aggregate "indices" to measure underlying, unobserved governance. But we are not confident that we know how to build these indices. Often we are unsure both as to what is "good" governance, and how one can proxy for this vague concept using observable measures. We conduct an exploratory analysis of how researchers can address the "construct validity" of firm-level governance indices, which poses a major challenge to all studies that rely on these indices.Research Findings/Insights: We assess the construct validity of governance indices for four major emerging markets (Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey), developed in prior work. In that work, we built country-specific indices, using country-specific governance elements that reflect local norms, institutions, and data availability, and showed that these indices predict firm market value in each country. The use of country-specific indices puts great stress on the construct validity challenge of assessing how well a governance measure matches the underlying concept. We address here how well these four country-specific indices, and subindices for aspects of governance such as board structure or disclosure, coherently measure unobserved, underlying actual governance.Theoretical/Academic Implications: We provide guidance on how researchers can address the construct validity of corporate governance indices.Practitioner/Policy Implications: The uncertain construct validity of most corporate governance indices suggests caution in relying on research using these indices as a basis for firm-level governance changes, or country-level legal reforms.

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“…independence of the board members), the size and the structure (e.g. duality of the CEO/chairman) of the board as measures of board monitoring effectiveness (Linck et al, 2008;Tuggle et al, 2010;Lei and Song, 2012). In the literature, there is also another dimension of board effectiveness that has been studied, which is the frequency of board meetings (Booth and Deli, 1996;Vafeas, 1999).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiple directorships and board meeting frequency: evidence from France

Baccouche

Hadriche

Omri

2014

Applied Financial Economics

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This article examines the relationship between multiple directorships of directors and board meeting frequency. Precisely, using an ordered probit model, we empirically investigated the effect of accumulation of outside directorships by directors on board meeting frequency. The research sample is composed of 90 nonfinancial French-listed firms that belong to the SBF 120 index, over the period 2008 to 2010. The results suggest that multiple directorships by board members are positively associated with board meeting frequency. So, the findings indicate that the accumulation of outside directorships by directors may motivate the board of directors to meet more frequently.

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Board structure, corporate governance and firm value: evidence from Hong Kong

Cited by 40 publications

References 39 publications

Corporate governance and firm performance relationship: Implications for risk‐adjusted return behavior

Corporate governance and firm performance relationship: Implications for risk‐adjusted return behavior

Corporate governance indices and construct validity

Multiple directorships and board meeting frequency: evidence from France

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