A powerful practical solution is by far the most desired output when making decisions under the realm of uncertainty on any safety-critical marine or offshore units and their systems. With data and information typically being obtained incrementally, adopting Bayesian network (BN) is shown to realistically deal with the random uncertainties while at the same time making risk assessments easier to build and to check. A well-matched methodology is proposed to formalize the reasoning in which the focal mechanism of inference processing relies on the sound Bayes's rule/theorem that permits the logic. Expanding one or more influencing nodal parameters with decision and utility node(s) also yields an influence diagram (ID). BN and ID feasibility is shown in a marine evacuation scenario and that of authorized vessels to floating, production, storage, and offloading collision, developed via a commercial computer tool. Sensitivity analysis and validation of the produced results are also presented.

The incorporation of the human element into a probabilistic risk-based model is one that requires a possibilistic integration of appropriate techniques and/or that of vital inputs of linguistic nature. While fuzzy logic is an excellent tool for such integration, it tends not to cross its boundaries of possibility theory, except via an evidential reasoning supposition. Therefore, a fuzzy-Bayesian network (FBN) is proposed to enable a bridge to be made into a probabilistic setting of the domain. This bridge is formalized by way of the mass assignment theory. A framework is also proposed for its use in maritime safety assessment. Its implementation has been demonstrated in a maritime human performance case study that utilizes performance-shaping factors as the input variables of this groundbreaking FBN risk model.

In dealing with complex and ill-defined systems of an offshore application, modelling of human reasoning for the purpose of risk assessment requires the effectiveness of a systematic logic-based approach. Floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) installations, for example, combine traditional process technology with marine technology, and thus are quite dependent on technical design and operational safety control. Such safety-critical dependencies require novel approaches to properly analyse the risk involved. Hence, a proposed framework utilising approximate reasoning and evidential reasoning approaches is provided for modelling the assessment task. As based on fuzzy set theory, the model enables uncertainties to be described mathematically and further processed in the analysis of the structures. The forms of membership functions that could be used in representing fuzzy linguistic variables to quantify risk levels are presented. A case study of collision risk between FPSO and shuttle tanker due to technical failure during tandem offloading operation is used in this paper to illustrate the application of the proposed model. Furthermore, the obtained results from the case study provide confirmation that at various stages of offshore engineering systems design process the framework of incorporated approximate reasoning is a suited and convenient tool for attaining reliable risk analysis.

Numerous acts of Parliament and statutory instruments that apply to floating production, storage, and offloading (FPSO) developments in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf, covering a wide range of issues, including health, technical safety, work place safety, lifting operations, environmental protection, and pollution prevention and control, are described. A comprehensive study of system safety evaluation of a typical turret-mooring system used on FPSOs is described in this paper. A safety assessment method suggested using approximate reasoning and evidential reasoning approaches is proposed in this study. Subjective safety modeling at the bottom level in a hierarchical framework is carried out using an approximate reasoning approach. The evidential reasoning method is used to combine or aggregate safety estimates at lower levels to produce the safety estimate at the system level. The four main subsystems(turret, fluid transfer system, turret transfer system, and interfacing system) are thoroughly examined in order to perform a subjective safety assessment of the turret-mooring system.

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