Young children show more vigilance against individuals with poor knowledge than those with antisocial motives

Abstract

In three experiments, the present research investigated whether children's distrust of unreliable informants was influenced by the type of mental state causing the informants' unreliability. Children (total N = 167) played a searching game with an informant who repeatedly provided incorrect information either due to poor knowledge or to intentional deception resulting from antisocial motives. Results of Experiment 1 showed that children initially distrusted the ignorant informant more than the deceptive informant, but that levels of distrust increased and converged after children received feedback on their responses. Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and also extended them by showing that children consistently distrusted the ignorant informant more than the deceptive informant in the absence of feedback. Experiment 3 helped rule out the possibility that results could be explained by the wording of informant descriptions in Experiments 1 and 2. Taken together, our results contribute to a small body of findings suggesting that young children have the capacity to use mental state information to make selective trust judgments and suggest that young children show more vigilance against individuals with poor knowledge than those with antisocial motives. Highlights How does the type of mental state causing unreliability (either ignorance or antisocial motives) influence children's vigilance against unreliable sources? A direct comparison showed that children (3 ‐ 4 years old) distrusted ignorant sources more than antisocial sources. Children use mental state information to make selective trust judgements.

Social‐oriented versus task‐oriented streamer interaction styles on live streaming e‐commerce: Empirical research in China

“…Specifically, consumers exhibiting epistemic vigilance tend to critically evaluate the reliability of the speaker rather than taking it for granted (Sperber et al, 2010). This vigilance can hinder the development of trust, leading consumers to resist adopting the discourse of the streamer, and increasing the likelihood of non-engagement (Vanderbilt et al, 2018).…”

“…Specifically, consumers exhibiting epistemic vigilance tend to critically evaluate the reliability of the speaker rather than taking it for granted (Sperber et al, 2010). This vigilance can hinder the development of trust, leading consumers to resist adopting the discourse of the streamer, and increasing the likelihood of non‐engagement (Vanderbilt et al, 2018). Conversely, consumers who are less epistemically vigilant tend to think more superficially about the sender's words and are more likely to accept what is presented at face value, resulting in a greater willingness to engage.…”

Training young children in strategic deception promotes epistemic vigilance.

“…Young children’s limitations in evaluating others as sources of information may be especially strong when questions of motives come into play (Vanderbilt et al, 2018). Although young children do have some understanding of the implications of lying and deceptive motives (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009; Reyes-Jaquez & Echols, 2015; Stengelin et al, 2018), they often fail to apply this understanding when they encounter individuals with such motives, even when motive information is directly provided to them (Heyman et al, 2013).…”

“…For example, Vanderbilt et al (2014) found that 3-and 4-year-old children systematically trusted a single individual who provided inaccurate information about object labels and explicitly reported that this unreliable informant would be a good source of future information about object names. Young children's limitations in evaluating others as sources of information may be especially strong when questions of motives come into play (Vanderbilt et al, 2018). Although young children do have some understanding of the implications of lying and deceptive motives (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009;Reyes-Jaquez & Echols, 2015;Stengelin et al, 2018), they often fail to apply this understanding when they encounter individuals with such motives, even when motive information is directly provided to them (Heyman et al, 2013).…”