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Population Aging and Migration

“…The distortions in public provision of education could be alleviated by graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from emigrants. Poutvaara (2000), Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000), and Wildasin (2000) also show that when the educated become mobile, international tax competition tends to result in tax burden being shifted on immobile factors of production, thereby unravelling public financing of higher education. States in 1980s, and its subsequent decline when the growth rate in new cohorts entering the labor force in Mexico converged towards that in the United States.…”

Brain Drain, Fiscal Competition, and Public Education Expenditure

“…Another related strand of the literature deals with tax competition in the context of human capital formation. Wildasin (2000) and Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000) show that under perfect mobility of high-skilled labor, tax competition drives down the tax rate of high-skilled labor to zero in a small open economy. 5 In contrast to these papers, we analyze competition through public education expenditure between two large economies under imperfect mobility of high-skilled labor.…”

“…He argues that under private education financing, the mobility of high-skilled labor is efficiency-enhancing because it provides insurance against idiosyncratic risk across regions with specific human capital investment. Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000) consider a framework where low-ability workers are willing to subsidize the education of high-ability workers in a closed economy if there are positive externalities of acquiring education. However, the mobility of high-skilled labor makes such a social contract infeasible.…”

Bildungsreform in der Demokratie

“…Ein ähnliches, empirisch besser gestütztes Argument basiert auf Faktorkomplementaritäten zwischen hoch und niedrig qualifizierter Arbeit. Ein Anstieg des akademisch gebildeten Bevölkerungsanteils verknappt das relative Angebot an geringer qualifizierten Arbeitern und erhöht deren Lohn (Johnson 1984, Poutvaara und Kanniainen 2000. Dieser Effekt kann so stark sein, dass die Nichtakademiker sich sogar für eine stärkere Subventionierung höherer Bildung aussprechen als die direkten Subventionsempfänger.…”