Would an increasing block carbon tax be better? A comparative study within the Stackelberg Game framework

Zhou, Dequn; An, Yunfei; Zha, Donglan; Wu, Fei; Wang, Qunwei

doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.01.082

Cited by 59 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…Chen and Hu [43] proposed a policy portfolio that combined a dynamic carbon tax and a static subsidy to encourage enterprises to increase investments in green innovation. Zhou et al [63] proposed imposing an increasing block carbon tax to weaken the regressive nature of carbon taxes in terms of income distribution and maximize the effects of the carbon tax on emission reductions. Sun et al [64] suggested that governments could impose a carbon tax by applying different tax rates to different industrial sectors to achieve an equilibrium between carbon emission reductions and social welfare targets.…”

Section: Optimizing the Design Of Carbon Taxesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Green-Innovation-Inducing Effect of a Unit Progressive Carbon Tax

Xiao

Meng

et al. 2021

Sustainability

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The major global economies are facing increasing pressure to reduce their carbon emissions. Introducing environmental policy instruments to stimulate green innovation is key to mitigating global warming. We propose a carbon tax design with a typical green innovation orientation that links carbon taxes with the low-carbon technology (LCT) of enterprises and imposes a progressive tax on heterogeneous enterprises with LCT stock to encourage green innovation. This study used a dynamic evolution game model based on the Stackelberg model of heterogeneous enterprises with LCT stock to analyze the green-innovation-inducing effect of unit progressive carbon taxes. A unit progressive carbon tax could encourage enterprises to participate in green innovation, regardless of their initial green innovation willingness. The progressive tax rate was more effective than a fixed rate for stimulating green innovation by all enterprises. There was a marginal diminishing effect of increases in the tax rate. An increase in the innovation cost coefficient of enterprises reduced the green-innovation-inducing effect of the unit progressive carbon tax. Increasing the tax rate was effective only under normal circumstances. A decline in the carbon reduction in enterprises also reduced the green-innovation-inducing effect of the unit progressive carbon tax. Furthermore, increasing the tax rate when the carbon reduction amount was extremely low caused enterprises to abandon green innovation.

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Section: Optimizing the Design Of Carbon Taxesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Green-Innovation-Inducing Effect of a Unit Progressive Carbon Tax

Xiao

Meng

et al. 2021

Sustainability

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“…e first part is about the impact of the carbon tax policy and related carbon emission reduction policy on the government and enterprises. Zhou et al [6] constructed a social welfare model considering carbon tax emission and discussed the theoretical characteristics of the proposed carbon tax policy based on the Stackelberg game. en, the differences and similarities between a flat carbon tax and an increasing block carbon tax are analyzed using a numerical simulation.…”

Section: Carbon Tax Policy and Green Supply Chain Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions in a Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer under Carbon Tax Regulation

Yan-gang

Shen

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Carbon tax is an emission regulation, which widely used to curb the carbon emissions generated from firms. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms need to determine an optimal carbon reduction level and optimal product prices. To address firms’ decision-making challenges, this paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under carbon tax policy; it establishes a Stackelberg game model with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer who is the leader of the game. The paper studies the influence of the government’s carbon tax policy and retailer’s risk-averse attitude on the optimal decision of the supply chain. The result shows that when the retailer is risk aversion, the degree of risk aversion of the retailer is positively correlated with the wholesale price of the manufacturer and unit carbon emission reduction, and within a certain range of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, it is positively correlated with the price of products; with the increase of the carbon tax rate imposed by the government, the retail price of unit products, the wholesale price of the manufacturer, and the carbon emission reduction of unit products also increase. Finally, the results are verified by numerical examples.

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“…One category includes players with binding agreement among them. Second category includes those players who are not having binding agreement among them [40]. In non cooperative game theory, main focus is on predicting individual strategies and it also asses players that make decisions to find Nash Equilibrium (NE).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Due to uncontrollable and uncertain nature of energy generation by renewable resources [44], we used electricity generation forecasting techniques to get short term prediction value. Afterwards, distributed MG energy management problem has been addressed using non cooperative game theory as it ignores common commitment of players and it contains low communication overhead [40]. Optimization of storage capacity in MG has vital role in context of efficient management of electric load, which has also been addressed in this paper.…”

Section: Problem Statement and Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Game Theoretical Energy Management with Storage Capacity Optimization and Photo-Voltaic Cell Generated Power Forecasting in Micro Grid

et al. 2019

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In order to ensure optimal and secure functionality of Micro Grid (MG), energy management system plays vital role in managing multiple electrical load and distributed energy technologies. With the evolution of Smart Grids (SG), energy generation system that includes renewable resources is introduced in MG. This work focuses on coordinated energy management of traditional and renewable resources. Users and MG with storage capacity is taken into account to perform energy management efficiently. First of all, two stage Stackelberg game is formulated. Every player in game theory tries to increase its payoff and also ensures user comfort and system reliability. In the next step, two forecasting techniques are proposed in order to forecast Photo Voltaic Cell (PVC) generation for announcing optimal prices. Furthermore, existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium (NE) of energy management algorithm are also proved. In simulation, results clearly show that proposed game theoretic approach along with storage capacity optimization and forecasting techniques give benefit to both players, i.e., users and MG. The proposed technique Gray wolf optimized Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (GARIMA) gives 40% better result and Cuckoo Search Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (CARIMA) gives 30% better results as compared to existing techniques.

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Would an increasing block carbon tax be better? A comparative study within the Stackelberg Game framework

Cited by 59 publications

References 57 publications

The Green-Innovation-Inducing Effect of a Unit Progressive Carbon Tax

The Green-Innovation-Inducing Effect of a Unit Progressive Carbon Tax

Pricing and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions in a Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer under Carbon Tax Regulation

Game Theoretical Energy Management with Storage Capacity Optimization and Photo-Voltaic Cell Generated Power Forecasting in Micro Grid

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