Worksharing, Pricing and Competition in the Postal Sector

Villemeur, Étienne Billette de; Cremer, Helmuth; Roy, Bernard; Toledano, Joëlle

doi:10.1007/0-387-23637-6_7

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 11 publications

(6 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However, the first paper does not analyze the optimal discount, and the second assumes that the access price for competitors is restricted to equal the rate charged for worksharing mail to clients. Billette de Villemeur et al (2005) find that with first best prices the worksharing discount is equal to avoided cost. However, in a second-best setting the worksharing discount may exceed this value.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information*

Calzada

2006

J Regul Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper analyzes the optimal worksharing and access amounts granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized postal sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office’s (PO) costs. I show that when the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of the total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal “access discount” given to entrants is set in a pro-competitive way. This facilitates the entry of firms that are less efficient than the PO. However, the optimal “worksharing discount” may prevent the entry of mailers that are more efficient than the PO. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006access pricing, worksharing discounts, competition, postal, D43, L51,

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Finally, Panzar (2003) and Billette de Villemeur et al (2005) consider the discounts offered to mailers and to entrants simultaneously. However, the first paper does not analyze the optimal discount, and the second assumes that the access price for competitors is restricted to equal the rate charged for worksharing mail to clients.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information*

Calzada

2006

J Regul Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This opens delicate issues that would deserve specific attention but are beyond the scope of the present work. 9 See Section 5 for a discussion of the case in which firms choose quality before price.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We suppose that both operators choose their own price and quality simultaneously 9 . We further take price and quality to be observable and verifiable.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It evidences that firm E acts as a monopolist vis-à-vis the "residual demand", X E . Moreover, according to equation (9), quality q E is chosen so that marginal returns from quality improvements (the left-hand side) equate marginal costs (the right-hand side). The latter are expressed by the sum of the direct costs of quality (the first term) and its indirect costs (as reflected in the second term) that follow from the demand increments induced by quality raise.…”

Section: The Profit-maximizing (P E Q E ) −Pairmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Partial Regulation in Vertically Differentiated Industries

Bergantino

Villemeur

Vinella

2011

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper offers theoretical foundations to price-and-quality cap regulation of recently liberalized utilities in which vertically differentiated services are provided by a regulated incumbent and an unregulated entrant competing in price and quality. The model may equally well represent competition across asymmetrically regulated industries. We establish that, in a variety of strategic settings, optimal weights in the cap targeted to the incumbent depend also on the market served by the entrant, despite the latter is not directly concerned by regulation. This calls for the possibility that regulators use information about the whole industries, rather than on the sole incumbents. We also evidence that the proposed regulatory scheme is robust to small errors in the estimation of the social value of quality.Keywords: Price-and-quality cap; Partial regulation; Vertical differentiation J.E.L. Classification numbers: D43, L13, L51 * The paper was completed while the second author was visiting the University of Montréal, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. We are indebted with Carlo Fiorio, David Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet, Bertrand Villeneuve, Ingo Vogelsang, an Associate Editor and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We further acknowledge useful comments from participants at the XVIII SIEP Meeting (Pavia), the 5th Infraday (Berlin), the 4th Conference on Railroad Industry Structure, Competition and Investment (Madrid), the 47th SIE Meeting (Verona) and the 22nd EEA Meeting (Budapest) as well as from seminar participants at the University of Florence. All remaining errors are our own.

show abstract

Farmgate prices, retail prices, and supermarkets' pricing decisions: An integrated approach

Russo

Goodhue

2017

Agribusiness

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Agricultural and food prices exhibit several empirical regularities that are not easily explained by conventional perfect competition or market power models, including asymmetric price transmission, food price rigidity, farmgate price volatility, and low correlation between prices at different stages of the supply chain. We focus on this set of market features and conclude that they can be the outcome of a competition model where supermarket use promotions to strategically attract basket shoppers. We present a numerical simulation to show that complex price patterns including all the features indicated above can be obtained from a general store traffic competition model without the need of introducing ad hoc assumptions. [EconLit citations: Q11, Q13].

show abstract

Worksharing, Pricing and Competition in the Postal Sector

Cited by 10 publications

References 11 publications

Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information*

Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information*

Partial Regulation in Vertically Differentiated Industries

Farmgate prices, retail prices, and supermarkets' pricing decisions: An integrated approach

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About