Work Absence in Europe

Lusinyan, Lusine; Bonato, Leo

doi:10.1057/palgrave.imfsp.9450016

Cited by 57 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 35 publications

(48 reference statements)

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“…We do not model the membership decision as our data, to be described below, does not allow us to test any resulting prediction. (2007), and Lusinyan and Bonato (2007). Evidence for a positive impact of employment protection legislation on absence is provided by Ichino and Riphahn (2005) and Olsson (2009), inter alia.…”

Section: Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform

Goerke

Pannenberg

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In 1996, statutory sick pay was reduced for private sector workers in Germany. Using the empirical observation that trade union members are dismissed less often than non-members, we construct a model to predict how absence behaviour will respond to the sick pay reform. Terms of use: Documents inWe show that union members may have stronger incentives to be absent and to react to the cut in sick pay. In the empirical investigation, we find a positive relationship between trade union membership and absence due to sickness and observe more pronounced reactions to the cut in sick pay among union members than among non-members. These findings suggest that more flexibility in the use of paid absence due to sickness constitutes a private gain from trade union membership.JEL-Code: I180, J510, J220.Keywords: difference-in-differences, sickness-related absence, Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), statutory sick pay, trade union membership. We are grateful to Nicolas Ziebarth for helpful comments and for providing background information on industry-specific bargaining contracts. Also, special thanks to Laszlo Goerke

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Section: Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See, for example, Allen (1981), Brown and Sessions (1996), Engström and Holmlund (2007), and Lusinyan and Bonato (2007).…”

Section: Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform

Goerke

Pannenberg

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…2 On the contrary, economic improvement clearly survives in 1 Only three studies (Böckerman andLaukkanen, 2009, 2010;Johansson and Lundberg, 2004) investigate both sickness states at once, and these will be discussed in more detail below. In contrast, the bulk of the literature investigates either sickness absence (for an early survey article, see Brown and Sessions, 1996; for literature using European cross-country data, see Frick and Malo, 2008;Livanos and Zangelidis, 2013;Lusinyan and Bonato, 2007) or presenteeism behavior (see Arnold, forthcoming;Aronsson et al, 2000;Aronsson and Gustafsson, 2005;Böckerman and Laukkanen, 2009;Hansen andAndersen, 2008, 2009;Leineweber et al, 2011;Preisendörfer, 2010).…”

Section: Work-related Characteristics Sickness Presenteeism and Absencementioning

confidence: 99%

How are Work-related Characteristics Linked to Sickness Absence and Presenteeism? Theory and Data

Arnold¹,

Pinto²

2015

Schmollers Jahrbuch

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. October, 2015 AbstractThis paper investigates how changes in work-related factors affect workers' absence and presenteeism behavior. Previous studies (implicitly) assume that there is a substitutive relationship, i.e. a change in a work-related factor decreases the level of absence and simultaneously increases presenteeism (or vice versa). We set up a theoretical model in which work-related characteristics not only affect a worker's absence decision but also the individual-specific sickness definition. Since workrelated factors affect presenteeism through these two channels, nonsubstitutive relationships between absence and presenteeism are also conceivable. Using European cross-sectional data, we find only few substitutive and complementary relationships, while the bulk of the work-related characteristics is related only to one of the two sickness states.

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“…However, some researchers have emphasized that a potential ‘selection’ mechanism is at work, whereby absence‐prone workers are more likely to be fired in recessionary periods and (re‐)hired during booms (Arai and Thoursie, 2005). Nevertheless, the fact that the strength of the procyclical nature of absenteeism persists even amongst countries with high employment protection legislation (EPL) casts some doubt on the latter hypothesis (Lusinyan and Bonato, 2007).…”

Section: Empirical Evidence Of the Equilibrium Wage‐risk Tradeoffmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Health and Safety at Work: An Interdiciplinary Review of the Theory and Policy

Pouliakas

Theodossiou

2011

Journal of Economic Surveys

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This paper engages in an interdisciplinary survey of the current state of knowledge related to the theory, determinants and consequences of occupational safety and health (OSH). It first describes the fundamental theoretical construct of compensating wage differentials, which is used by economists to understand the optimal provision of OSH in a perfectly competitive labour market. The plethora of incentives faced by workers and firms in job and insurance markets that determine the ultimate level of OSH are discussed in detail. The extensive empirical evidence from the hedonic wage and stated choice approaches used to assess the value of OSH is reviewed. The causes of inefficiency and inequity in the market for OSH, such as externalities, moral hazard in compensation insurance, systematic biases in individual risk perception/wellbeing and labour market segregation are subsequently examined. The implications of government intervention and regulation for tackling the aforementioned inefficiencies in OSH are then considered. Finally, the survey identifies areas of future research interests and suggests indicators and priorities for policy initiatives that can improve the health and safety of workers in modern job markets.

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Work Absence in Europe

Cited by 57 publications

References 35 publications

Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform

Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform

How are Work-related Characteristics Linked to Sickness Absence and Presenteeism? Theory and Data

The Economics of Health and Safety at Work: An Interdiciplinary Review of the Theory and Policy

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