Wittgenstein and Bodily Self‐Knowledge

Harcourt, Edward

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00193.x

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 12 publications

(21 reference statements)

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“…But why is it the case? And even if one accepts this premise, what is precisely a sensation that is separately describable and how to decide if it is or not (see the debate between Harcourt [2008] and McDowell [2011], for instance)? Anscombe (1962: 57) claims that ‘the visual impression of a blue expanse’ is separately describable and can thus ground the judgment that the sky is blue but in what sense does this qualify as an independent description?…”

Section: Mynessmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?

Vignemont¹

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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In a 1962 article, ‘On Sensations of Position’, G. E. M. Anscombe claimed that we do not feel our legs crossed; we simply know that they are that way. What about the sense of bodily ownership? Do we directly know that this body is our own, or do we know it because we feel this body that way? One may claim, for instance, that we are we aware that this is our own body thanks to our bodily experiences that ascribe the property of myness to the body that they represent. Here I approach this issue from the perspective of the debate on the admissible content of perception, appealing to the method of phenomenal contrast. After rejecting the myness hypothesis, I criticize alternative accounts of the contrast in somatosensory, cognitive, and agentive terms. I conclude that the phenomenology of ownership consists in the affective awareness of the unique significance of the body for survival.

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Section: Mynessmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?

Vignemont¹

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…The argument schema has been called the argument from cognitive impenetrability (Mylopoulos, 2015). It assumes that there is a feeling of x if it seems to one that x while one correctly judges that there is no x (Harcourt, 2008) However, the argument from cognitive impenetrability has been criticized on the ground that other attitudes than feelings and sensations can be encapsulated and immune to the influence of beliefs and judgments (McDowell, 2011;Bermudez, 2015;Mylopoulos, 2015). But what attitudes precisely?…”

Section: Feeling or Merely Knowing?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bodily Feelings

Vignemont¹

2020

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness

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This chapter will focus on ‘bodily feelings’, which express the various facets of the enduring relation that the subject has with her body in relation to the world. In particular, it will focus on three such feelings: the feeling of bodily presence, the feeling of bodily capacities, and the feeling of bodily ownership. After describing these bodily feelings in more detail, we will ask to what extent they are feelings at all, and if they are, how to best interpret their phenomenology: in sensory, affective, cognitive, or even metacognitive terms?

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2010

The Nature and Value of Knowledge

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Wittgenstein and Bodily Self‐Knowledge

Cited by 8 publications

References 12 publications

What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?

What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?

Bodily Feelings

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