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There seems to be no dimension of bodily awareness that cannot be disrupted. To account for such variety, there is a growing consensus that there are at least two distinct types of body representation that can be impaired, the body schema and the body image. However, the definition of these notions is often unclear. The notion of body image has attracted most controversy because of its lack of unifying positive definition. The notion of body schema, onto which there seems to be a more widespread agreement, also covers a variety of sensorimotor representations. Here, I provide a conceptual analysis of the body schema contrasting it with the body image(s) as well as assess whether (i) the body schema can be specifically impaired, while other types of body representation are preserved; and (ii) the body schema obeys principles that are different from those that apply to other types of body representation.

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Touch differs from other exteroceptive senses in that the body itself forms part of the tactile percept. Interactions between proprioception and touch provide a powerful way to investigate the implicit body representation underlying touch. Here, we demonstrate that an intrinsic primary quality of a tactile object, for example its size, is directly affected by the perceived size of the body part touching it. We elicited proprioceptive illusions that the left index finger was either elongating or shrinking by vibrating the biceps or triceps tendon of the right arm while subjects grasped the tip of their left index finger. Subjects estimated the distance between two simultaneous tactile contacts on the left finger during tendon vibration. We found that tactile distances feel bigger when the touched body part feels elongated. Control tests showed that the modulation of touch was linked to the perceived index-finger size induced by tendon vibration. Vibrations that did not produce proprioceptive illusion had no effect on touch. Our results show that the perception of tactile objects is referenced to an implicit body representation and that proprioception contributes to this body representation. We also provide, for the first time, a quantitative, implicit measure of distortions of body size.

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In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric ("you") or an allocentric ("he/she/they") stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person needs to be represented as independent from the self. We suggest here that people with Asperger syndrome suffer from a disconnection between a strong naïve egocentric stance and a highly abstract allocentric stance. We argue that the currently used distinction between first-person and third-person perspective-taking is orthogonal to the distinction between an egocentric and an allocentric stance and therefore cannot serve as a critical test of allocentrism.

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