ICASSP 2020 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP) 2020
DOI: 10.1109/icassp40776.2020.9052930
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Witchcraft: Efficient PGD Attacks with Random Step Size

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Cited by 9 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…In this framework, we can understand backdoor attacks as choosing the optimal ∆ directly based on a given rule (here via patch insertion onto training images with the target label y adv i ), whereas optimization-based methods such as [6] optimize some approximation of the (intractable) full bilevel optimization problem. Witches' Brew [6] approximately optimizes ∆ by modifying training data so the gradient of the training objective is aligned with the gradient of the adversarial loss L F (x t i , θ(∆)), y adv i , using optimization methods based on adversarial literature [16,17].…”
Section: Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this framework, we can understand backdoor attacks as choosing the optimal ∆ directly based on a given rule (here via patch insertion onto training images with the target label y adv i ), whereas optimization-based methods such as [6] optimize some approximation of the (intractable) full bilevel optimization problem. Witches' Brew [6] approximately optimizes ∆ by modifying training data so the gradient of the training objective is aligned with the gradient of the adversarial loss L F (x t i , θ(∆)), y adv i , using optimization methods based on adversarial literature [16,17].…”
Section: Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We evaluated the proposed MLF-DA detection accuracy on three benchmark datasets, namely CIFAR10, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR100 (14) (15) , to new attack types, namely BIM (16) , MIM (17) , MAD (18) , FGSM (19) , PGD (20) and CW (3) . Novel CNN classifiers were built for MNIST, CIFAR10, FashinMNIST, and CIFAR100, for which an accuracy of 99.20%, 92.80%, 99%, and 96%, respectively was achieved.…”
Section: Experimental Setup and Evaluationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Adversarial examples [78], i.e., nearly imperceptibly perturbed inputs causing misclassification, consider an adversarial environment where potential attackers can actively manipulate inputs. This has been shown to be possible in the white-box setting, with full access to the DNN, e.g., [20], [79], [80], [81], [82], as well as in the black-box setting, without access to DNN weights and gradients, e.g., [83], [84], [85], [86]. Such attacks are also transferable between models [87] and can be applied in the physical world [88], [89].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%