Wille, Willkür, and the Imputability of Immoral Actions

Hudson, Hud

doi:10.1515/kant.1991.82.2.179

Cited by 25 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Only choice can therefore be called free" (6:226). For discussion see Beck (1987), Hudson (1991), Kosch (2006: 60-61).…”

Section: Relative Spontaneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect

McLear¹

2020

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Kant holds that the applicability of the moral 'ought' depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify "cognitive control" in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing. Considered merely as intelligence, a human being is an imputable subject in which, of course, at the same time is united a natural being that subjects it to natural laws; [a being] nevertheless, whose determination depends upon intelligence, insofar as the possibility to act is granted him; therefore it is only to be derived how far a human being can be called cause of his actions and these can be imputed to him; and [it is] just as certain that, if he were led merely by natural laws, it would be impossible to impute to him any action, since the ground of action then would never lie in his control, but rather would be determined in the previous time.

show abstract

“…Only choice can therefore be called free" (6:226). For discussion see Beck (1987), Hudson (1991), Kosch (2006: 60-61).…”

Section: Relative Spontaneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect

McLear¹

2020

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…E.g., Allison (1990) and Kemp Smith (1992). iii See Wood (1984) and Hudson (1991). One exception is Hudson (1994).…”

Section: Conclusion: Kant's Unique Compatibilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…iii See Wood (1984) and Hudson (1991). One exception is Hudson (1994). iv See, e.g., Allison (1996).…”

Section: Conclusion: Kant's Unique Compatibilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Pre-Critical Roots of Kant’s Compatibilism

Zoller¹

2007

Philosophy and Theology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Dentre vários comentaristas que já apontavam para essa dificuldade, pode-se citar: Ferdinand Alquie (s/d: 96), Ralph Walker (1982: 147, 1989: 16 e 1999, Hud Hudson (1991: 179-176) e Emil Fackenheim (1992. Divirjo, porém, de certas considerações que Rawls faz sobre o mundo inteligível e o mundo sensível, especialmente sobre sua possível inoperância, ou abandono dessa distinção na Religião.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Mal radical e psicologia moral em Kant segundo John Rawls

Pavão

2013

ethic@

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

RESUMO Em suas Lectures on the History of MoralPhilosophy, Rawls esposa a interpretação de que Kant teria se comprometido, sobretudo na Fundamentação, com o que ele chama, tendo Agostinho como inspiração, de "psicologia moral maniqueísta". Esse flerte inicial acabaria, porém, sendo abandonado, na Religião, em favor de uma "psicologia moral agostiniana". Essa psicologia atribui exclusivamente à liberdade do arbítrio a fonte do mal moral e repele a ideia de que o mal teria como causa nossa natureza desiderativa ou, até mesmo, social. Pode-se afirmar que, ao fazer uso da expressão "psicologia moral agostiniana", Rawls apenas chama a atenção, com outro nome, para o que, mais consagradamente, tem sido chamado, a partir de Allison, de tese da incorporação. Esse parece um ponto incontroverso, ou majoritariamente aceito pelos comentaristas de Kant. Não me parece ser o caso, porém, da presença na filosofia moral de Kant do que Rawls chama de psicologia moral maniqueísta. Tal psicologia afirma a existência de dois eus, um bom, que temos à medida que pertencemos ao mundo inteligível, e outro mau, que possuímos como seres do mundo sensível. Rawls corretamente assinala as dificuldades que, de imediato, emergem a partir da psicologia moral maniqueísta, nomeadamente a relacionada à teoria do mal moral em geral e, correspondentemente, à compreensão da responsabilidade moral. O objetivo do artigo será discutir se Rawls tem razão em atribuir ao pensamento moral de Kant na Fundamentação essa tal psicologia moral maniqueísta. Defenderei que a leitura de Rawls, em seus aspectos mais gerais, é procedente. Sustentarei, porém, que certas considerações que Rawls faz sobre o mundo inteligível e o mundo sensível, especialmente sobre sua possível inoperância, ou abandono dessa distinção na Religião, não merecem acolhimento pleno. Também advogarei que a leitura de Rawls se ressente da ausência de um apelo a recursos conceituais internos à Fundamentação autenticadores da presença, nessa obra, da psicologia moral agostiniana. Palavras-chave: psicologia moral, imputação, liberdade, bem, mal, livre arbítrio ABSTRACTIn his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Rawls defends the interpretation that Kant would be compromised, especially in the Groundwork, with "Manichean moral psychology". However, his initial approach would be abandoned, in Religion, in favor of an "Augustinian moral psychology." This psychology assigns exclusively to the freedom of choice the source of moral evil and rejects the idea that evil would has as cause our desiderative or even social nature. It can be argued that, by making use of the phrase "Augustinian moral psychology," Rawls only draws attention with another name the more well-known, "Incorporation Thesis" (so called from Henry Allison). This seems uncontroversial point, or overwhelmingly accepted by commentators on Kant. However, it does not seem to be the case with reference to the presence in Kant's moral philosophy of what Rawls calls Manichean moral psychology. Such psychology asserts the existence of t...

show abstract

Wille, Willkür, and the Imputability of Immoral Actions

Cited by 25 publications

References 0 publications

On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect

On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect

The Pre-Critical Roots of Kant’s Compatibilism

Mal radical e psicologia moral em Kant segundo John Rawls

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About