Will Change in Government Affect China–Pakistan Economic Corridor? The BRI, CPEC and the Khan Government: An Analysis

Abstract

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was formally launched in 2015. From the very outset, skeptics raised doubts about its sustainability and meaningfulness for particularly Pakistani society, economy and the state. Nevertheless, the Sharif government in strategic interaction with its Chinese counterpart ably thwarted such controversies and ensured execution of the CPEC projects in different parts of Pakistan. Though within Pakistan, political opposition and certain nationalist political and social forces voiced their related concerns, for instance, to the “route” alignment, the federal and Punjab government led by the Sharifs held ground and accorded priority to sustain the Corridor by engaging local and provincial stakeholders. However, this was not the case with the Khan government whose commerce advisor doubted the negotiated terms and conditions of the CPEC and, therefore, called for its revision to provide a fair deal to the Pakistani side. Why did the Khan government adopt such a policy? How does such a discourse affect China–Pakistan relation in general and CPEC and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) in particular? What made the Khan government correct its path ultimately? In other words, does change in government impact CPEC negatively? This paper attempts to address these questions empirically.

Local Pakistani Citizens’ Benefits and Attitudes Toward China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Projects

“…Another economic expert has proposed that the CPEC will enhance the economy of local people as the CPEC generates large-scale and local businesses. In addition, scholars have assumed that the local community of Pakistan will support the development of CPEC projects and that they are willing to gain opportunities from the CPEC (Hussain, 2019;Ibrar et al, 2018;Kanwal et al, 2019a). More the promotions of the economic, income, and business opportunities for the regional community, more the cooperation from the local community will be.…”

“…For the successful implementation of CPEC projects, scholars have proposed that the education of a local community is to be made essential because local residents are the major stakeholders of the CPEC (Hussain, 2019;Iqbal, 2017;Islam et al, 2017;Kanwal et al 2019a). Furthermore, Li et al (2015) argued that the education of the local community is a fundamental factor for the success of any project.…”

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: Macro Environmental Factors and Security Challenges

“…The present political ruling party, that is, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) rose as third major party to govern through center. Despite facing continuous unrest by opposition parties manifest in the form of worst intermittent protests, marches, and disagreements, neither the previous, nor the current government was dissolved and nor the military institution had to bypass them (Hussain, 2019; Javed, 2020).…”

“…This addressed their grievances for the project with a positive impression. Eventually the Chinese political government was positively accepted as a neutral cooperative partner (Ahmed, 2018; Hussain, 2019).…”

China–Pakistan Economic Cooperation: The Case of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

“…Indeed, the current Pakistan Tehreek Insaf (PTI) government led by Prime Minister Imran khan initially viewed certain CPEC projects skeptically. 50 This means that though CPEC has been successful in terms of acceptability as a mega economic project between China and Pakistan, it still requires further fine-tuning at the popular level. 51 If one goes by the foregoing, it is speculated that the construction of the Special Economic Zones would not be free of political challenges emanating primarily from non-Punjab provinces and autonomous regions.…”