Wielding the green stick: criminal enforcement at the EPA under the Bush and Obama administrations

Ozymy, Joshua; Jarrell, Melissa L.

doi:10.1080/09644016.2014.921453

Cited by 17 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(32 reference statements)

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“…As Mintz () rightfully argues, simply measuring enforcement outcomes is problematic, given the detailed nature of investigations and ultimate lag in assigning responsibility for a certain political actor in influencing particular outcomes in a research paper. Acknowledging this lag when dealing with environmental databases is common and necessary in empirical research (Ozymy & Jarrell, ) and similarly is a severe limitation of our own study and this area of research generally. We recognize the lag effect the Scott administration is likely having on F‐DEP decisions, but feel our analysis generally sheds light on what a governor, so open about his positions were on reduced environmental enforcement, is likely having through all of his various formal and informal powers on environmental outcomes in the state.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Oftentimes executives are stymied on domestic policy, as they must navigate the separation of powers to accomplish their goals, while working through pressure from organized interests, lobbyists, grassroots organizations, and the internal dynamics of the bureaucratic organizations that are tasked with implementing their policies (Atlas, ; Barnes, ). This principal–agent game of competing institutional and noninstitutionalized interests working to influence the actions of agencies helps to explain why making good on campaign promises for substantive domestic policy change is often quite difficult for not only U.S. presidents, but the governors of the U.S. states as well (McCubbins & Schwartz, ; Ozymy & Jarrell, ).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Executive Actors and Environmental Enforcement: Examining the “Rick Scott Effect” in the U.S. State of Florida

Lynch

Ozymy

Jarrell

2019

Review of Policy Research

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Executive actors wield power within a principal–agent structure, where they compete with multiple political actors and administrative agencies to influence environmental enforcement outcomes. While the U.S. states make for an excellent laboratory to explore this phenomenon, a lack of quality enforcement data and the multifaceted dynamics of control makes it difficult to study these relationships. Using data on the number of environmental cases opened, sanctioned, and penalized by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 2005–15, this article takes advantage of a natural experiment in the U.S. state of Florida to explore the influence of an anti‐environmental governor on environmental enforcement outcomes. While we make no claims that Governor Rick Scott caused the precipitous decline in enforcement outcomes we witness pre‐ and post‐Scott, results demonstrate, descriptively, the influence executive actors can have on environmental enforcement outcomes in the state.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive Actors and Environmental Enforcement: Examining the “Rick Scott Effect” in the U.S. State of Florida

Lynch

Ozymy

Jarrell

2019

Review of Policy Research

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“…7. See Sussman and Kelso (1999, 140); see also Tzoumis, Bennett, and Stoffel (2015) and Ozymy and Jarrell (2015). MilitaryFactory.com (2017) and iCasualties.com (2017)…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contemporary Presidency: A Lasting Legacy? Presidents, National Monuments, and the Antiquities Act

Kelso¹

2017

Pres Stud Q

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The Antiquities Act became law in 1906 at the urging of President Theodore Roosevelt. The law allows presidents to declare national monuments, and thus preserve public land, without congressional approval. While the use of the Act has varied over time, in recent Democratic administrations this legislation has become a major component of environmental policy making. This study examines the use of the Antiquities Act by presidents in order to understand this Act as a policy device and what its development says about environmental policy in modern times. The article also discusses recent efforts to redefine this presidential power.

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“…Only a handful of extant studies examine the distribution of environmental crime prosecutions or environmental crime charges over time. Many employ US data (Cohen, 1988(Cohen, , 1992Brickley 2001;O'Hear, 2004;Pena-Sanchez, 2010;Crow, Shelley, & Stretesky, 2013;Ozymy & Jarrell, 2015;Lynch, 2017;, with fewer studies available for European nations (Earnhart, 1997;Rousseau, 2009;Almer & Goeschl, 2010;Billiet, Blondiau, & Rousseau, 2014;Blondiau, Billiet, & Rousseau, 2015). For most nations, little is known about the use of criminal prosecutions and penalties in relation to the enforcement of environmental regulations, and consequently how widespread criminal enforcement efforts are in different national contexts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental crime prosecutions in Ireland, 2004–2014

Lynch

Stretesky

Long

2019

International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justi

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Despite increased interest in environmental crime and green criminology, few studies address the use of criminal penalties in response to environmental crimes. A handful of published examples employ data from the United States or the Flanders court system, and little is known about how other nations punish environmental violations. Addressing this issue, the current study examined the use of criminal environmental penalties in Ireland from 2004 to 2014. Few criminal environmental cases (N = 147) and few environmental offenders (N = 154) were represented in these data over time. Consistent with the expectations of green/environmental crime researchers, mean penalties for environmental violations, which in Ireland only include fines and investigative cost recovery penalties, were rather small. Unlike in the US or Flanders, the majority of offenders were corporate offenders as opposed to individuals. Contextual factors related to Ireland's economy, history and use of criminal sanctions should be used to interpret these factors, and prevent generalising from these data.

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Wielding the green stick: criminal enforcement at the EPA under the Bush and Obama administrations

Cited by 17 publications

References 22 publications

Executive Actors and Environmental Enforcement: Examining the “Rick Scott Effect” in the U.S. State of Florida

Executive Actors and Environmental Enforcement: Examining the “Rick Scott Effect” in the U.S. State of Florida

The Contemporary Presidency: A Lasting Legacy? Presidents, National Monuments, and the Antiquities Act

Environmental crime prosecutions in Ireland, 2004–2014

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