Executive Actors and Environmental Enforcement: Examining the “Rick Scott Effect” in the U.S. State of Florida

Abstract

Executive actors wield power within a principal–agent structure, where they compete with multiple political actors and administrative agencies to influence environmental enforcement outcomes. While the U.S. states make for an excellent laboratory to explore this phenomenon, a lack of quality enforcement data and the multifaceted dynamics of control makes it difficult to study these relationships. Using data on the number of environmental cases opened, sanctioned, and penalized by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 2005–15, this article takes advantage of a natural experiment in the U.S. state of Florida to explore the influence of an anti‐environmental governor on environmental enforcement outcomes. While we make no claims that Governor Rick Scott caused the precipitous decline in enforcement outcomes we witness pre‐ and post‐Scott, results demonstrate, descriptively, the influence executive actors can have on environmental enforcement outcomes in the state.

The impact of public environmental concern on environmental pollution: The moderating effect of government environmental regulation

“…In China, the environmental protection administrative departments impose administrative penalties on individuals or enterprises who violate environmental laws and regulations. The higher frequency of administrative penalties implemented by local governments indicates a greater emphasis on environmental protection and sustainable development in the respective regions, as well as a stronger degree of environmental governance [ 48 ].…”