Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe

Mearsheimer, John J.

doi:10.2307/2538686

Cited by 69 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Reagan 1990. Some academics disputed this conventional wisdom, arguing that NATO would be able to hold the line or even prevail in a conventional war; see Cohen 1988: Mearsheimer 1982and Posen 1984a. 77.…”

Section: Reassurance and The End Of The Cold Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation

Kydd¹

2000

Int Org

185

108

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Many scholars have argued that mistrust can prevent cooperation. These arguments often fail to adequately address the possibility that states can take steps to reassure each other, build trust, and thereby avoid conflict. I present a rational choice theory of reassurance focusing on costly signals and identify the conditions under which players can use costly signals to reassure the other side. The central result is that reassurance will be possible between trustworthy players in equilibrium if trustworthy actors are more willing to take risks to attain mutual cooperation than untrustworthy actors. I discuss the implications of the model in the context of the reassurance strategies pursued by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War.

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Section: Reassurance and The End Of The Cold Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation

Kydd¹

2000

Int Org

185

108

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“…[25] V době publikace (1983) otázka rezonovala v politických diskusích souvisejících s konvenčním dozbrojením NATO a případné nutnosti využít jaderné zbraně proti konvenčního útoku VS.…”

Section: Příklad Scénáře: Sovětský úTok Na Natounclassified

Back to the Future: Counterfactuals and Scenarios in Defense Research and Planning

Kofroň¹

2015

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“…Second, both anticipated contingencies-most especially in Europewere tied up with the use of nuclear weapons and the superpower confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. If one truly believed a Warsaw Pact invasion of Central Europe would become a general nuclear exchange within a few days of weeks, planners concentrated mainly on preventing that occurrence rather than winning a conventional war, though there were some dissenters (e.g., Mearsheimer 1982). Of course the major causality of the lost operational art was the failure to grow a new generation of operational-level planners who understood strategy and who could think through the mechanisms various strategy options offered.…”

Section: Desert Stormmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incorporating Effects-Based Operations into Military Operations

McCrabb¹

2005

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Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe

Cited by 69 publications

References 19 publications

Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation

Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation

Back to the Future: Counterfactuals and Scenarios in Defense Research and Planning

Incorporating Effects-Based Operations into Military Operations

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