Why Should We Be Wise?

Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism

“…Therefore, in claiming that there are certain beliefs that some people ought not to hold (and therefore ought to drop), Hume is violating the contrapositive of ‗Ought implies Can '. In what follows I will put forward some evidence that Hume maintains each of the three positions outlined above. I then examine what I call the ‗Prior Voluntary Action' solution endorsed by Passmore (1980), Norton (1982Norton ( , 1994Norton ( , 2002, Falkenstein (1997), Owen (1999), Williams (2004), andMcCormick (2005), among others. I argue that ‗Prior Voluntary Action' in any form fails to account for synchronic rationality.…”

“…One objection to attributing ‗Prior Voluntary Action' in either form to Hume is the lack of textual support for Hume taking prior voluntary actions to be essential to the evaluation of our beliefs. 16 Some textual evidence is put forth by Falkenstein (1997), Owen (1999), McCormick (2005), and Hickerson (2013). Falkenstein (1997, p. 33) and Owen (1999, p. 216) point to Hume's Endnote H to Section 9 in his first Enquiry.…”

Hume on Education

“…Normative accounts include those based on unavoidability or irresistibility (Kemp Smith, 1941;Millican, 2012), reflexivity (Baier, 1991, pp. 99-100;1993, p. 39), reliability (Dauer, 1980;Costa, 1981;Schmitt, 2014;Beebee, 2011), proper function (Wolterstorff, 1996, p. 166n6;Craig, 1987, p. 81), virtue and moral approval (Owen, 1999;McCormick, 2005) and, as we have seen, stability (Loeb, 2002). Here is not the place to assess such accounts, except to say that my interpretation puts constraints on which account of normativity should be adopted.…”

“…McCormick () endorses Falkenstein's () account of the role of general rules in the correction of belief, but argues that his account does not provide enough to explain ‘why we should be wise’; her claim is that ‘Hume's preference and recommendation for following reason is politically motivated. The point is that the world will be a better place if more people choose reason as their guide’ (McCormick, , pp. 12–13).…”

Hume’s practically epistemic conclusions?

“…In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The 'usefulness and agreeableness reading' (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified on the basis of their usefulness and agreeableness to the self and others; proponents include Ardal (1976), Owen (1999), Ridge (2003), Kail (2005), and McCormick (2005, while Schafer (forthcoming) also defends an interpretation along these lines. 2 In this paper, I will argue that although U&A has textual merit, it struggles to maintain a substantive distinction between epistemic and moral justificationa distinction that Hume insists on in claiming that 'Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable' (THN 3.1.1.10).…”