Why Pragmatics and Theory of Mind Do Not (Completely) Overlap

Abstract

Aim of the paper is to discuss the extent to which pragmatics, i.e., the ability to use language and other expressive means to convey meaning in a specific interactional context, overlaps with Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and the others. We present empirical data available in the current literature concerning the relation between these two faculties, with specific reference to the developmental and clinical domains. Part of the literature we take into account appears to show that ToM does correlate with pragmatic ability; however, other studies appear to show that pragmatic ability alone cannot explain the empirical differences of performance across different kinds of pragmatic tasks, and therefore that another, at least partially different faculty is required to account for human communication. We argue that to conceive pragmatics as a sort of subcomponent of ToM, and thus to conflate or reduce the notion of pragmatics into the (wider) notion of ToM, is not theoretically correct and a possible cause of methodological confusion in the relevant empirical research. It thus turns out to be necessary that the two faculties be investigated with separate theories as well as different experimental tasks.

Pragmatic Competence

“…However, when interpreted in terms of an overlap between pragmatics and ToM, this view does not allow to fully account for the available data, where the involvement of ToM in pragmatic tasks is fragmentary and unsystematic across the literature. In line with recent proposals in the field (Bosco et al 2018), we argue that pragmatics and ToM do not overlap. A more likely scenario is that pragmatic competence is a specific capability, which in turn might exploit an array of other cognitive abilities, differently engaged depending on the specific task.…”

“…It would be simplistic, however, to assume that irony can be collapsed into ToM. Bosco and colleagues have developed a research line targeting sincere, ironic, and deceitful communication in development and in clinical conditions, and consistently reported cases where ToM alone is not sufficient to explain behaviour in non-literal communication (Bosco and Gabbatore 2017;Bosco, Tirassa, and Gabbatore, 2018). There is clearly more than ToM alone in determining the ability to understand ironic meanings.…”

The Ability of Patients With Schizophrenia to Comprehend and Produce Sincere, Deceitful, and Ironic Communicative Intentions: The Role of Theory of Mind and Executive Functions

“…For similar results and conclusions, see Bosco et al (2012) and Bosco and Gabbatore (2017a,b). The lack of a ToM causal role in explaining the ability of patients with schizophrenia to process ironic communicative acts also suggests that tasks based on irony comprehension should be used with caution to measure patients’ mentalizing ability (for a deeper discussion, please see Bosco et al, 2018c). ToM is a complex and useful theoretical construct enhancing our understanding of the symptomatology associated with diverse clinical conditions, but ToM appears to be a cognitive domain that does not completely overlap with the pragmatic domain (Laghi et al, 2014; Bambini et al, 2016, Bosco et al, 2018c).…”

Beyond the motor account of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis: Verbal humour and its relationship with the cognitive and pragmatic profile

“…This interplay has been described as a puzzling issue because pragmatic skills are often intertwined with ToM and executive skills (Martin and McDonald 2003). Recent accounts, however, have clarified that these domains, although interrelated, do not completely overlap (Bosco et al 2018) and they might differently affect clinical populations.…”