Why Monist Critiques Feed Value Pluralism

Plaw, Avery

doi:10.5840/soctheorpract20043014

Cited by 12 publications

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“…Pero tal planteamiento, como decimos, no se corresponde con el pluralismo de Berlin. 15 Véase la crítica de Plaw a Dworkin a este respecto (Plaw, 2004).…”

Section: Conclusiones: Pluralismo Frente a Relativismounclassified

Pluralismo sin relativismo: una propuesta alternativa al modelo de Isaiah Berlin

Ureta¹

2019

Rev. Estud. Polít.

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The aim of this article is to analyse whether value pluralism can be successfully distinguished from relativism. Following Isaiah Berlin's proposal, communication will be first presented as the key difference between the two perspectives. Then, with the help of diagrams, two different pluralist approaches to situations in which communication breaks down will be examined. This analysis, particularly focused on the question of Nazism, will prove that Berlin's arguments in favour of distinguishing pluralism from relativism fail, since his notion of value pluralism is based only on historical and ethnocentric reasons, allegedly possessing normative force. Then, an alternative view of pluralism without relativism, built upon Berlin's ideas, but clearly beyond his own proposal, will be offered. To conclude, it will be argued that value pluralism depicts a faithful image of our human condition and is, all in all, a valid perspective from which many valuable lessons may be learned, particularly in our current and future multicultural societies.

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“…Pero tal planteamiento, como decimos, no se corresponde con el pluralismo de Berlin. 15 Véase la crítica de Plaw a Dworkin a este respecto (Plaw, 2004).…”

Section: Conclusiones: Pluralismo Frente a Relativismounclassified

Pluralismo sin relativismo: una propuesta alternativa al modelo de Isaiah Berlin

Ureta¹

2019

Rev. Estud. Polít.

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“…I briefly draw attention to just one more here. Incommensurability may be seen as involving the possibility of disagreement even given reasonable reflection: ‘Incommensurability marks a practical limit on the power of reason alone to decide value conflicts’ (Plaw, 2004, p. 113). As stated, this is compatible with a Humean approach to normativity but Plaw likens political judgments involving incommensurability in this sense to aesthetic judgments and he clearly does not think of the latter as merely subjective.…”

Section: Incomparability and Incommensurabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistency, Understanding and Truth in Educational Research

Davis

2006

J Philosophy of Education

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What do Elliot Eisner's discussions of objectivity mean for the strength of the link between consistency and truth in educational research? Following his lead, I pursue this question by comparing aspects of qualitative educational research with appraising the arts. I argue that some departures from the highest levels of consistency in assessing the arts are compatible with truth and objectivity, and that this is at least suggestive for how consistency in qualitative educational research should be viewed. In the final part of the paper I look at some problems inherent in comparing the value of works of art, and consider whether similar issues arise when we attempt to grade different kinds of educational research.

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Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics

Talisse

2010

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Contemporary Neo-Berlinians contend that value pluralism is the best account of the moral universe we inhabit; they also contend that value pluralism provides a powerful case for liberalism. In this paper, I challenge both claims. Specifically, I will examine the arguments offered in support of value pluralism; finding them lacking, I will then offer some reasons for thinking that value pluralism is not an especially promising view of our moral universe.

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Why Monist Critiques Feed Value Pluralism

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Pluralismo sin relativismo: una propuesta alternativa al modelo de Isaiah Berlin

Pluralismo sin relativismo: una propuesta alternativa al modelo de Isaiah Berlin

Consistency, Understanding and Truth in Educational Research

Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics

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