2010
DOI: 10.1007/s10677-010-9229-8
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Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics

Abstract: Contemporary Neo-Berlinians contend that value pluralism is the best account of the moral universe we inhabit; they also contend that value pluralism provides a powerful case for liberalism. In this paper, I challenge both claims. Specifically, I will examine the arguments offered in support of value pluralism; finding them lacking, I will then offer some reasons for thinking that value pluralism is not an especially promising view of our moral universe.

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Cited by 17 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Monism, in this view, justifies repressive politics and violence to achieve a political order without disharmony of values. The claimed liberal implications of VP have, however, also been criticized, in particular by Gray (1996), Kekes (1997), and Talisse (2010, 2011, 2012). The basic problem they point out is that liberalism itself prioritizes certain values (e.g., freedom of choice) over others (cf.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Monism, in this view, justifies repressive politics and violence to achieve a political order without disharmony of values. The claimed liberal implications of VP have, however, also been criticized, in particular by Gray (1996), Kekes (1997), and Talisse (2010, 2011, 2012). The basic problem they point out is that liberalism itself prioritizes certain values (e.g., freedom of choice) over others (cf.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mindful of this, I had expected a critical response. However, I must admit I was disappointed at the somewhat ungenerous and sometimes picayune tone of at least some of his comments, which seemed more designed to shut off rather than encourage an open conversation on these important issues, something I found somewhat ironic in light of his argument that value pluralism, with its emphasis on hard moral choice, “runs the risk of being a conversation stopper” (Talisse, 2011, p. 98). Nonetheless, setting my personal disappointment aside, I believe it would be helpful, in replying to Talisse, to clarify further my views on the meaning of value pluralism, its implications, and the nature of philosophy.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Robert Talisse notes, however, there is some reason to doubt whether value pluralism could save the appearance of rational regret in difficult choice situations (Talisse 2011). To illustrate his argument, he asks us to imagine a hypothetical choice between leading the impulsive life of an artist and the disciplined life of a monk.…”
Section: Ontic Political Emergentismmentioning
confidence: 99%