Why Mexico Did Not Become a Military Dictatorship

Abstract

The retirement of the army from national politics after 1940 was one of the main distinguishing marks of modern Mexico. This chapter gauges the extent of that retirement, finding that it followed a near-coup in 1948 and that its endurance relied, paradoxically, on the veto power of an informal senate of senior generals. In exchange for their surrender of national power, soldiers remained autonomous and energetic rent-seekers at the subnational level, where region and zone commanders enjoyed free hands to dabble in the politics and business of the states. The army’s subordination to civilian rule was in reality only to the president, and it rested on a Faustian pact. It was enough, however, to stop Mexicans from following the rest of Latin America into military dictatorship.

Mexico's Dirty War: A Reassessment

“…They now counter the traditional view that violence was only used in exceptional circumstances in the preceding decades (Ovalle, 2023: 48–53). In fact, during the 1940s and 1950s, off‐the‐books pistoleros regularly worked for Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party) politicians (often as their drivers); certain groups including teachers, communists and difficult unions were repeatedly met with armed force; soldiers still policed the countryside, even waging war against aftosa with the ‘sanitary rifle’; political opponents were often arrested; and difficult journalists were murdered with impunity (Padilla, 2008; Servin, 2010; Alegre, 2013; Rath, 2013; McCormick, 2016; Piccato, 2017; Smith, 2018: 157–188; Gillingham, 2021: 161–189; Padilla, 2021; Rath, 2022). Coercion, or at least the threat of coercion, moulded the shape of state–society interaction.…”

The Fall of Virtuous Men: Mexican Film Noir, and the Crisis of Values in the Postrevolutionary State, 1950–1959

“…Moreover, the early 1940s mark the start of what historians and economists have referred to as the “Mexican miracle,” a period of steady growth and increasing levels of development that transformed the provincial character of Mexico City and the largest state capitals in the country, Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Puebla (Carmona and Montaño 1970; Meyer 2013, 93). The construction of new avenues, modern housing projects, hospitals, universities, high-rise buildings, public transportation and highway systems, lighting and electrification infrastructure, and the increase of vehicular traffic made these cities appear, at least in part, to be dynamic and growing urban centers, and in 1960 their growth pushed the national urban population above the 50 percent threshold (Gillingham 2021, 192, 197; Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI) 1996, 40).…”

“…Contemporary historians recognize the final years of the administration of General Ávila Camacho (1940–1946), and especially the presidency of Miguel Alemán (1946–1952), as the moment when the ruling regime’s authoritarian character was fully revealed and the official political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) became firmly implanted as the principal hegemonic force in the country (Alexander 2016, 179; Meyer 2013, 85; Paxman 2014). On the one hand, presidential power locked in the support of labor unions by reversing the internal democratic process and corrupting many labor leaders or forcing their submission to the policies of the ruling party (Alexander 2016, 158; Gillingham 2021, 105–107; Hodges and Gandy 2002, 33–36; Peña and Aguirre 2006, 439). On the other hand, the government sealed a firm alliance with the country’s financial and industrial elites as well as the major players of transnational capital (Alexander 2016, 81; Gillingham 2021, 191; Niblo 2000, 189).…”

“…On the one hand, presidential power locked in the support of labor unions by reversing the internal democratic process and corrupting many labor leaders or forcing their submission to the policies of the ruling party (Alexander 2016, 158; Gillingham 2021, 105–107; Hodges and Gandy 2002, 33–36; Peña and Aguirre 2006, 439). On the other hand, the government sealed a firm alliance with the country’s financial and industrial elites as well as the major players of transnational capital (Alexander 2016, 81; Gillingham 2021, 191; Niblo 2000, 189). Party leaders instrumentalized the political system in order to tighten their grip on the most relevant social sectors.…”