Why medical professionals have no moral claim to conscientious objection accommodation in liberal democracies

Abstract

We describe a number of conscientious objection cases in a liberal Western democracy. These cases strongly suggest that the typical conscientious objector does not object to unreasonable, controversial professional services-involving torture, for instance-but to the provision of professional services that are both uncontroversially legal and that patients are entitled to receive. We analyse the conflict between these patients' access rights and the conscientious objection accommodation demanded by monopoly providers of such healthcare services. It is implausible that professionals who voluntarily join a profession should be endowed with a legal claim not to provide services that are within the scope of the profession's practice and that society expects them to provide. We discuss common counterarguments to this view and reject all of them.

Response to: ‘Why medical professionals have no moral claim to conscientious objection accommodation in liberal democracies’ by Schuklenk and Smalling

“…The recent essay by Schuklenk and Smalling1 is striking in its one-sidedness and dogmatism. The authors start by setting up a straw man, implying that the use of the Nazi analogy is the major argument used by those in favour of giving status to physicians' conscience demands.…”

Conscientious objection of the Spanish notaries on the occasion of the new law of voluntary jurisdiction

“…Incluso allí donde el derecho estatal se ha mostrado históricamente proclive a admitir exenciones al cumplimiento de leyes aparentemente neutrales, pero que lesionan la conciencia religiosa, se ha abierto paso de forma decidida opiniones discordantes con las denominadas religious accommodations o "adaptaciones" (exenciones, alternativas) a los requerimientos de respeto de la conducta observada por motivos religiosos o de conciencia (Hamilton, 2015;Hill QC, 2016;Horwitz, 2015;Schuklenk & Smalling, 2016). Quizá esta abierta prevención y este sentido restrictivo de la libertad vengan condicionados por el "el miedo a abrir una caja de Pandora, a desencadenar una suerte de 'apocalipsis jurídico', como si reconocer un derecho a la objeción de conciencia implicara necesariamente hacerlo de manera absoluta o incontrolada."…”

Against the accommodation of subjective healthcare provider beliefs in medicine: counteracting supporters of conscientious objector accommodation arguments

“…Maclure and Dumont take issue with our view that it is impossible to demonstrate the truth of the metaphysical or normative foundations of conscientious objection claims, and to demonstrate uncontroversially that objectors actually genuinely hold the views they claim to hold 2. They also point out that courts do ‘probe the “sincerity” of the claimant’ 1.…”