Against the accommodation of subjective healthcare provider beliefs in medicine: counteracting supporters of conscientious objector accommodation arguments

Abstract

We respond in this paper to various counter arguments advanced against our stance on conscientious objection accommodation. Contra Maclure and Dumont, we show that it is impossible to develop reliable tests for conscientious objectors' claims with regard to the reasonableness of the ideological basis of their convictions, and, indeed, with regard to whether they actually hold they views they claim to hold. We demonstrate furthermore that, within the Canadian legal context, the refusal to accommodate conscientious objectors would not constitute undue hardship for such objectors. We reject concerns that refusing to accommodate conscientious objectors would limit the equality of opportunity for budding professionals holding particular ideological positions. We also clarify various misrepresentations of our views by respondents Symons, Glick and Jotkowitz, and Lyus.

Harmonizing conscience claims and patient access to assisted death

“…12,15,22,23 The power imbalances that are inherent in healthcare compel us to assure that patients are not subjected to heightened imbalances that the exercise of conscience might entail. 11,24 A competing view about the legitimacy of conscience protections holds that no room exists for conscientious objection regarding services such as assisted death, when a clinician acts as an agent of the state in a publicly funded health system. 18 Rather, it is argued such a clinician must be prepared to offer, provide, or facilitate in some manner, the legal and clinically acceptable service if a patient freely chooses it, in respect of the patient's autonomy.…”

“… 12 , 15 , 22 , 23 The power imbalances that are inherent in healthcare compel us to assure that patients are not subjected to heightened imbalances that the exercise of conscience might entail. 11 , 24 …”

Making healthcare decisions in a person’s best interests when they lack capacity: clinical guidance based on a review of evidence

“…They will not be asked to be part of any treatment which they could not deliver for reasons of personal conscience. (This is subject to debate [58][59][60] but is a practical approach. )…”

Objeção de consciência médica em casos de abortamento

“…Nesse mesmo sentido, Smalling e Schuklenk (7) defendem que "A objeção de consciência leva invariavelmente à redução de acesso a cuidados e serviços a pacientes" (tradução livre). Os autores respondem a alguns argumentos favoráveis ao direito à objeção de consciência, como a de que a restrição ocasionaria uma injustiça e negaria igualdade de oportunidades aos objetores de consciência, que no caso da IVG se limita aos médicos e médicas.…”