Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?1

MacAskill, William; Ord, Toby

doi:10.1111/nous.12264

Cited by 61 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(19 reference statements)

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“…I have argued that De Re Significance accounts face problems when appraising neuroatypical agents, because of their focus on the moral significance of a particular kind of moral reason, 36 Nor does it imply that evil is in general its own excusemost ordinary wrongdoers do not lack the capacity to respond to moral reasons. 37 On this point see MacAskill andOrd (2020), Field (2019), Harman (2015), Weatherson (2014).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons

Field

2021

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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De Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons

Field

2021

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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“…In other words, if it does not seem obvious to you that the value of freedom outweighs the value of well-being, or if you are uncertain whether to rank the former ahead of the latter, you face a decision-making dilemma. If you choose to resolve the uncertainty in some manner, for instance, by using some specific ranking, or favouring a meta-moral decision rule such as maximising expected choice-worthiness (MacAskill and Ord 2020 ) to favour well-being over freedom, you will not eliminate the moral tension from your mind. You will still be left wondering, given the uncertainty, whether you got the value trade-off right, or whether the meta-moral rule was correct (Nickel 2020 ).…”

Section: The Problem Of Tragic Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

Tragic Choices and the Virtue of Techno-Responsibility Gaps

Danaher

2022

Philos. Technol.

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There is a concern that the widespread deployment of autonomous machines will open up a number of ‘responsibility gaps’ throughout society. Various articulations of such techno-responsibility gaps have been proposed over the years, along with several potential solutions. Most of these solutions focus on ‘plugging’ or ‘dissolving’ the gaps. This paper offers an alternative perspective. It argues that techno-responsibility gaps are, sometimes, to be welcomed and that one of the advantages of autonomous machines is that they enable us to embrace certain kinds of responsibility gap. The argument is based on the idea that human morality is often tragic. We frequently confront situations in which competing moral considerations pull in different directions and it is impossible to perfectly balance these considerations. This heightens the burden of responsibility associated with our choices. We cope with the tragedy of moral choice in different ways. Sometimes we delude ourselves into thinking the choices we make were not tragic (illusionism); sometimes we delegate the tragic choice to others (delegation); sometimes we make the choice ourselves and bear the psychological consequences (responsibilisation). Each of these strategies has its benefits and costs. One potential advantage of autonomous machines is that they enable a reduced cost form of delegation. However, we only gain the advantage of this reduced cost if we accept that some techno-responsibility gaps are virtuous.

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“…There is a growing philosophical literature built on attempts to answer this question and others like it. A number of philosophers have argued for various norms that we should follow when uncertain about moral facts [Lockhart 2000;Ross 2006;Sepielli 2009Sepielli , 2012Gustafsson and Torpman 2014;MacAskill and Ord 2020]. Others have argued that no such subjective norms exist, that what we should do is in fact what the true moral theory says we should do, regardless of our beliefs [Weatherson 2014;Harman 2015].…”

Section: The Problem: Non-cognitivism and Moral Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists

Makins

2021

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgments. In much recent philosophical literature, this kind of moral doubt has been analysed in terms of uncertainty in one's moral beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that moral judgments express a kind of conative attitude, more akin to a desire than a belief. This paper presents a scientifically informed reconciliation of non-cognitivism and moral doubt. The central claim is that attitudinal ambivalence-the degree to which one holds conflicting attitudes towards the same object-can play the role of moral doubt for non-cognitivists. I will demonstrate that ambivalence has all of the features that we would expect it to have in order to play the role of moral doubt. It is gradable, can vary through time, covaries with strength of motivation, and is suitably distinct from the other features of our moral judgments. As well as providing a defence of non-cognitivism, this insight poses a new challenge for the view-deciding how to act under moral ambivalence.

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Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?1

Cited by 61 publications

References 31 publications

Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons

Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons

Tragic Choices and the Virtue of Techno-Responsibility Gaps

Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists

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