Tragic Choices and the Virtue of Techno-Responsibility Gaps

Abstract

There is a concern that the widespread deployment of autonomous machines will open up a number of ‘responsibility gaps’ throughout society. Various articulations of such techno-responsibility gaps have been proposed over the years, along with several potential solutions. Most of these solutions focus on ‘plugging’ or ‘dissolving’ the gaps. This paper offers an alternative perspective. It argues that techno-responsibility gaps are, sometimes, to be welcomed and that one of the advantages of autonomous machines is that they enable us to embrace certain kinds of responsibility gap. The argument is based on the idea that human morality is often tragic. We frequently confront situations in which competing moral considerations pull in different directions and it is impossible to perfectly balance these considerations. This heightens the burden of responsibility associated with our choices. We cope with the tragedy of moral choice in different ways. Sometimes we delude ourselves into thinking the choices we make were not tragic (illusionism); sometimes we delegate the tragic choice to others (delegation); sometimes we make the choice ourselves and bear the psychological consequences (responsibilisation). Each of these strategies has its benefits and costs. One potential advantage of autonomous machines is that they enable a reduced cost form of delegation. However, we only gain the advantage of this reduced cost if we accept that some techno-responsibility gaps are virtuous.

Artificial intelligence and responsibility gaps: what is the problem?

“…5 The possibility that responsibility gaps might not be problematic has been noted by Himmelreich (2019, n14 and n15) and Robillard (2018, p. 708). That there might even be something positive about responsibility gaps has been suggested by Danaher (2022). 6 Matthias' original characterization of responsibility gaps is, in my view, rather unclear (Matthias, 2004).…”

The Responsibility Gap and LAWS: a Critical Mapping of the Debate

“…The issue has been discussed by a number of authors, some of the most recent ones:(Champagne & Tonkens, 2015;Chengeta, 2016;Crootof, 2016;Danaher, 2016Danaher, , 2022de Jong, 2020;Nyholm, 2018;Santoni de Sio & Mecacci, 2021;Tigard, 2020).4 Accountability and responsibility do not completely overlap, as agents can be morally responsible without being accountable and vice versa, but accountability and liability often presuppose moral responsibility. This is especially the case in criminal law, because although some moral wrongs do not concern criminal law, criminal law generally does deal with moral wrongness as criminal law is a practice that holds people responsible for wrongs they have committed.5 See for example:(Danaher, 2022; Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018;Roff, 2014). Throughout the rest of this paper, I will therefore refer to moral responsibility and only when strictly necessary use accountability or liability.…”

“…His position can be summarized as follows: there are times when we should prefer delegation to autonomous systems without attempting to resolve the responsibility gap that has arisen. See:(Danaher, 2022).…”

Responsibility Gaps and Retributive Dispositions: Evidence from the US, Japan and Germany

“…If principles of just war require the possibility to attribute moral responsibility yet the use of autonomous weapon systems can undermine this possibility, then, Sparrow concludes the development and use of such systems must be prohibited (for discussion, see e.g. Wallach & Allen, 2008;Arkin, 2009;Lin et al 2008;Sharkey, 2010Sharkey, , 2019Bryson, 2010;Asaro, 2012;Roff, 2013;Sparrow, 2016;Simpson & Müller, 2016;Leveringhaus, 2016;Rosert & Sauer, 2019;Gunkel, 2020;Coeckelbergh, 2020;Taddeo & Blanchard, 2022b, Danaher 2022. Others have traced questions of responsibility attribution in other domains such as autonomous cars (Hevelke & Nida-Rümelin, 2015;Lin, 2016;Lin et al 2017;Nyholm & Smids, 2016;Santoni de Sio, 2017;Nyholm, 2018;Sparrow & Howard, 2017) or examined its scope beyond the confines of a particular area of application (for a recent review see Santoni de Sio & Mecacci, 2021, see also Danaher, 2022).…”