Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment

Gibson, James L.; Caldeira, Gregory A.; Spence, Lester K.

doi:10.1177/106591290505800201

Cited by 186 publications

(113 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…At least until quite recently, democracy was for the Czech voters not necessarily an emanation of -or limited to -party politics, and there is a sense in which a non-partisan government is more legitimate (Hanley, 2013;Protsyk, 2005;Tucker et al, 2000). As scholars have used support as a proxy, if not quite equivalent, to legitimacy (Gibson et al, 2005), we could similarly argue that this is so in the present case too. To sum up, if 'democratic legitimacy is based on the belief that for a particular country at that particular juncture no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals' (Linz, 1978), then technocratic governments, under certain circumstances, must indeed be the best regime that would still command legitimacy.…”

Section: Illegitimate and Unaccountablementioning

confidence: 64%

Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right

Pastorella

2015

Political Studies

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In Europe, technocratic governments have become a popular topic of debate. Commentators have condemned them as a 'suspension of democracy' or even as 'the end of democracy as we know it'. However, no academic analysis has assessed whether technocratic governments are indeed undemocratic. This article is intended to fill this gap by assessing technocratic governments' democratic credentials. It compares them to party governments along the main dimensions of party democracy, including representation, deliberation, constitutionality and legitimacy. It concludes that technocratic governments in Europe are not undemocratic per se, but are still a worrying phenomenon insofar as they reveal shortcomings that remain hidden in normal party governments: a loosening of delegation and accountability ties between voters, parties and cabinets; increasing external pressures on domestic political actors; and the weakening of partisan ideology-based politics. The article will add further elements to reinforce the already vast literature on the crisis of -especially party -democracy in Europe.Keywords: democracy; technocracy; Eurocrisis; technocratic government; political party Technocratic governments, while not a new phenomenon on the European political scene, seem to have become a particularly widespread form of government recently. A comparatively high number of technocratic governments, as defined by Duncan McDonnell and Marco Valbruzzi (2014), have been appointed since the beginning of the Eurocrisis.1 It is therefore the right moment to ask a fundamental question: Are technocratic governments democratic? More specifically, do technocratic governments meet the standards of democracy as it is understood in Europe -that is, party democracy (Mair, 2008;Van Biezen, 2012;Van Biezen and Borz, 2012)? Common sense, even etymology, would seem to indicate that technocracy is, by definition, incompatible with any democracy. It generally partners well with autocracy. Together with populism they are the Scylla and Charybdis of democratic ideals. Technocratic governments even made some commentator mourn the 'end of democracy as we know it' (Brunkhorst, 2012). It is not clear, however, whether such accusations rest on any stable grounds, either in terms of democratic theory or democratic practice. Exploring such matters is important, on the one hand, to fully understand an under-explored political phenomenon -that of technocratic cabinets -and, on the other hand and more importantly, to add an additional perspective to assessing the status of European democracies. This article will therefore proceed as follows. After clarifying some of the terminology and concepts used, it will address major criticisms aimed at technocratic governments, touching upon problems related to constitutionality, electoral competition, policy choices, accountability and legitimacy. It will show that technocratic governments have been criticised on wrong assumptions or judged against unrealistic democratic standards. In the second part, the article will id...

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Section: Illegitimate and Unaccountablementioning

confidence: 64%

Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right

Pastorella

2015

Political Studies

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“…Ability refers to perceptions that the trustee has the competence and knowledge to fulfill or live up to the trustor's trust. Perceptions of legitimacythe institution's rightful and appropriate holding and use of power (Gau, 2012;Gibson et al, 2003;Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2005;Jackson & Gau, 2015;Tyler & Fagan, 2008;Tyler & Huo, 2002)-may also reflect perceptions of ability because competency-based credentials and licenses are key means by which to improve perceptions of legitimacy (Tyler & Huo, 2002).…”

Section: Trust Versus Trustworthinessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dimensionality of trust-relevant constructs in four institutional domains: results from confirmatory factor analyses

PytlikZillig¹,

Hamm

Shockley

et al. 2016

Journal of Trust Research

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“…Weber claims that these internal motivations are strongly influenced by judgments relating to institutional legitimacy. One useful way to conceptualize institutional legitimacy is as a form of loyalty (Gibson et al, 2005), or in Easton's (1965) term, a 'reservoir of goodwill'. Both conceptualisations capture the idea of citizen recognition of institutional authority, regardless of the short-term favourability provided by political parties and leaders.…”

Section: The Purpose and Objects Of Legitimacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Rebuilding institutional legitimacy in post-conflict societies: a case study of Nepal

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Legitimacy refers to the perceived rightfulness of authorities, and is central to citizens' perceptions of institutions such as the government. Legitimate authority is linked to acceptance of institutions and long-term stability of societies. As such, rebuilding the legitimacy of institutions such as the government and judiciary ('institutional legitimacy') is essential for stability in post-conflict societies. In this thesis, I explore the factors that lead citizens to view their government as legitimate following the reconstruction of central government institutions after a conflict. I draw on sociological, political science, social psychological and statebuilding theories to develop and present a theoretical model of post-conflict legitimacy.The model has three key components. The first encompasses relational and instrumental antecedents of legitimacy. Relational antecedents encompass fair and neutral decision-making, as well as respectful and dignified treatment, and are referred to collectively as procedural justice. Instrumental antecedents are those which involve outcomes to citizens, and include distributive justice (fairness in outcome distribution), outcome favourability (personal gain in outcomes), and government performance (the ability of the government to function effectively and provide services to citizens). These main variables are investigated along with contingencies relating to social groups that may influence the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy, such as national identification and group power. Testing of the first model component revealed that procedural justice was by far the strongest predictor of post-conflict institutional legitimacy, and was significantly stronger than instrumental variables such as distributive justice, government performance, and outcome favourability. Further, the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy was moderated by national identification and group power, suggesting that procedural justice operates through social identity to exert its positive effect. Moreover, the effect of procedural justice on government legitimacy was not simply due to trust and performance perceptions of local institutions, and was not diminished by the government's ability to provide essential services (as predicted by the statebuilding literature). 4Testing of the second model component revealed that two elements of local ownership-voice and local influence-weakly predicted legitimacy, with these relationships varying according to participants' position in the Nepalese caste hierarchy.Testing of the third model component revealed a significant social interaction effect, such that citizens' legitimacy beliefs are influenced by the legitimacy views of those around them. This effect persisted even when demographic, regional, and individual-level variables were controlled.This thesis concludes that procedural justice is more predictive of post-conflict institutional legitimacy than instrumental outcomes. Further, the relationship appears to operat...

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Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment

Cited by 186 publications

References 19 publications

Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right

Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right

The dimensionality of trust-relevant constructs in four institutional domains: results from confirmatory factor analyses

Rebuilding institutional legitimacy in post-conflict societies: a case study of Nepal

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