Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right

Abstract

In Europe, technocratic governments have become a popular topic of debate. Commentators have condemned them as a 'suspension of democracy' or even as 'the end of democracy as we know it'. However, no academic analysis has assessed whether technocratic governments are indeed undemocratic. This article is intended to fill this gap by assessing technocratic governments' democratic credentials. It compares them to party governments along the main dimensions of party democracy, including representation, deliberation, constitutionality and legitimacy. It concludes that technocratic governments in Europe are not undemocratic per se, but are still a worrying phenomenon insofar as they reveal shortcomings that remain hidden in normal party governments: a loosening of delegation and accountability ties between voters, parties and cabinets; increasing external pressures on domestic political actors; and the weakening of partisan ideology-based politics. The article will add further elements to reinforce the already vast literature on the crisis of -especially party -democracy in Europe.Keywords: democracy; technocracy; Eurocrisis; technocratic government; political party Technocratic governments, while not a new phenomenon on the European political scene, seem to have become a particularly widespread form of government recently. A comparatively high number of technocratic governments, as defined by Duncan McDonnell and Marco Valbruzzi (2014), have been appointed since the beginning of the Eurocrisis.1 It is therefore the right moment to ask a fundamental question: Are technocratic governments democratic? More specifically, do technocratic governments meet the standards of democracy as it is understood in Europe -that is, party democracy (Mair, 2008;Van Biezen, 2012;Van Biezen and Borz, 2012)? Common sense, even etymology, would seem to indicate that technocracy is, by definition, incompatible with any democracy. It generally partners well with autocracy. Together with populism they are the Scylla and Charybdis of democratic ideals. Technocratic governments even made some commentator mourn the 'end of democracy as we know it' (Brunkhorst, 2012). It is not clear, however, whether such accusations rest on any stable grounds, either in terms of democratic theory or democratic practice. Exploring such matters is important, on the one hand, to fully understand an under-explored political phenomenon -that of technocratic cabinets -and, on the other hand and more importantly, to add an additional perspective to assessing the status of European democracies. This article will therefore proceed as follows. After clarifying some of the terminology and concepts used, it will address major criticisms aimed at technocratic governments, touching upon problems related to constitutionality, electoral competition, policy choices, accountability and legitimacy. It will show that technocratic governments have been criticised on wrong assumptions or judged against unrealistic democratic standards. In the second part, the article will id...

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