Legitimacy and the Paradox of Technocratic Government in Newer European Democracies: The Fischer Administration in the Czech Republic Revisited

Abstract

The creation of technocratic caretaker governments in several European countries in the wake of the Great Recession (2008–2009) and the Eurozone crisis led to renewed academic interest in such administrations. Although such governments are often assumed to be illegitimate and democratically dysfunctional, there has been little empirical consideration of if and how they legitimate themselves to mass publics. This question is particularly acute given that, empirically, caretaker technocrat-led administrations have been clustered in newer, more crisis-prone democracies in Southern and Eastern Europe where high levels of state exploitation by parties suggest a weak basis for any government claiming technocratic impartiality. This article uses Michael Saward’s “representative claims” framework to re-examine the case of one of Europe’s longer-lasting and most popular technocratic administrations, the 2009–2010 Fischer government in the Czech Republic. The article maps representative claims made for Fischer and his government, as well as counterclaims. Claims drew on the electoral mandate of sponsoring parties, the government’s claimed technocratic neutrality, and on Fischer’s “mirroring” of the values and lifestyle of ordinary Czechs (echoing some populist framings of politics). The article argues that the Fischer government benefited from multiple overlapping representative claims, but notes the need for robust methodology to assess the reception claims by their intended constituency. It concludes by considering the implications of actors’ ability to combine populist and technocratic claims, noting similarities in technocratic governments and some types of anti-establishment party.

Who wants technocrats? A comparative study of citizen attitudes in nine young and consolidated democracies

“…If citizens perceive corruption as pervasive and see politicians and political parties as its root cause, then they are probably more prone to endorse the reduction of the role of professional politicians in decision-making (Hanley, 2018). The attractiveness of experts at the expense of politicians might be also fostered by the increasing popularity of non-elected judiciary officials fighting political corruption.…”

The Design of Pseudo-Participation

“…Rather, sometimes the aim is to start a process to only give an impression of real engagement. This is known as technocratic clientelism ("state-led regime with clientelistic mediation between the state and society" [19, p.17]) and it is characterized by an appearance of political effectiveness by the creation of participatory processes, where both popular control and people's agency are virtually non-existent [3,18,19]. Technocratic clientelism is part of a larger phenomenon of pseudoparticipation.…”

The Expert Cure? Exploring the Restorative Potential of Expertise for Public Satisfaction With Parties

“…In contrast to a system of party democracy, the technocratic approach is somewhat less defined (Centeno, 1993: 309) and often, as Hanley (2018) points out, is simply described as the ‘reverse mirror image’ of Richard Katz’s classic definition of party government. As an ideal type, technocracies are seen to govern in accordance with the knowledge and experience of ‘experts’.…”

“…Although recognised in political surveys, we argue that, to date, limited attention has been paid to the potential cross-fertilisation of these approaches. For this reason, we explore the potential for parties to capitalise on the appeal of experts and expertise, in accordance with Hanley’s (2018: 82) observation that ‘parties and elected politicians can (and do) boost their legitimacy with additional non-elective claims’ (emphasis added).…”