2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.009
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Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors

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Cited by 805 publications
(501 citation statements)
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“…Furthermore, the transactions that caused the greatest losses were carried out by a small group of companies with the relatively highest values of Tobin's Q ratio. Efendi et al (2007) provide evidence on CEOs opportunism in an eff ort to support an overvalued stock price (in line with Jensen's theory of overvalued equity). Th ey fi nd that CEOs with substantial amounts of (in-the-money) options are more likely to issue fi nancial statements with non-GAAP accounting irregularities.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 69%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Furthermore, the transactions that caused the greatest losses were carried out by a small group of companies with the relatively highest values of Tobin's Q ratio. Efendi et al (2007) provide evidence on CEOs opportunism in an eff ort to support an overvalued stock price (in line with Jensen's theory of overvalued equity). Th ey fi nd that CEOs with substantial amounts of (in-the-money) options are more likely to issue fi nancial statements with non-GAAP accounting irregularities.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 69%
“…Empirical studies conducted on a larger sample in the US market by means of various methods support Jensen's hypothesis (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005;Efendi, Srivastava, & Swanson, 2007;Marciukaityte & Varma, 2008;Chi & Gupta, 2009;Badertscher, 2011). Also studies based on surveys of chief fi nancial offi cers of the biggest US companies confi rm that one of the main 9 M. Kałdoński, T. Jewartowski, Agency costs of overvalued equity and earnings management motivations for earnings management is "to infl uence stock price" (Dichev, Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2016).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…Most rely on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which focuses on the role of the CEO as a selfinterested agent. In accordance with Becker's (1968) theory of crime, this view assumes that the decision to misreport financial performance is influenced by the CEO's personal assessment of the expected benefits versus possible penalties, especially when the CEO owns stock options in the company or when the CEO's bonus payments are linked to the performance of the company (Efendi et al, 2007;Zhang et al, 2008).…”
Section: Financial Incentivesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They identified senior management unethical attitudes, use of incentive systems and dishonest communications as important indicators of the likelihood to commit fraud or fraud risk. Efendi et al (2007) found that the likelihood of misstating financial statement increases when the CEO has a sizable amount of stock options and when firms are constrained by debt covenants. Other evidence for incentive-related fraud include: Lie (2005) and Burns and Kedia (2006).…”
Section: Define Fraudmentioning
confidence: 99%