Why do Authoritarian Regimes Provide Public Goods? Policy Communities, External Shocks and Ideas in China’s Rural Social Policy Making

Abstract

Recent research on authoritarian regimes argues that they provide public goods in order to prevent rebellion. This essay shows that the 'threat of rebellion' alone cannot explain Chinese party-state policies to extend public goods to rural residents in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Drawing on theories of policy making, it argues that China's one-party regime extended public goods to the rural population under the influence of ideas and policy options generated by policy communities of officials, researchers, international organisations and other actors. The party-state centre adopted and implemented these ideas and policy options when they provided solutions to external shocks and supported economic development goals. Explanations of policies and their outcomes in authoritarian political systems need to include not only 'dictators' but also other actors, and the ideas they generate. WHY DO AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES PROVIDE PUBLIC GOODS? MUCH research portrays autocrats as focussed on maximising their own revenues (Niskanen 1997; Acemoglu & Robinson 2000). It expects them to channel private goods to members of their support base in the 'selectorate', but to neglect the 'unenfranchised' majority (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). 1 Other recent studies have found authoritarian regimes sometimes do extend provision beyond their immediate support base-but only to groups who threaten rebellion. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), for example, argue that well institutionalised one-party regimes make policy concessions so as to co-opt those who might otherwise challenge them. Gallagher and Hanson (2009) similarly suggest authoritarian regimes sometimes try to reduce revolutionary 1 We do not have the space here to discuss the substantial literature categorising authoritarian regimes (Linz 2000), explaining their transitions to democracy (O'Donnell et al. 1986) and examining how they repress their opponents (Lichbach 1995; Wintrobe 1998).

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“…The reform and then the abolition of rural taxation was inspired in part by concerns about predation by local officials, and it was in part such concerns that had led Zhu Rongji in the 1990s to dismiss proposals for rural pensions and rural cooperative medical schemes (Duckett & Wang, 2017). Under Hu and Wen, it was precisely the use of experimentation when developing or gradually rolling out new initiatives that enabled the leadership to evaluate possible problems due to local government incapacity or corruption.…”

“…Journalists sometimes suggest that their professional experiences, which left them with a patent awareness of rural poverty, helped to persuade Hu and Wen to develop new government initiatives. Certainly, Hu Jintao had been Party Secretary of Guizhou, one of China's poorest, least industrialised interior provinces, while Wen Jiabao had been Vice-premier responsible for rural affairs under the previous leadership, where the farmers' burden (of fees and taxes) had been closely monitored for the protests it catalysed (Duckett & Wang, 2017). But Hu and Wen were careful to portray party-state policy decisions as collectively produced and to limit any suggestion of their personal influence.…”

“…Jiang's government had also paid too little attention to the distress of tens of millions of rural-urban migrants who posed a potential threat to public order (Howell, 2016). When these problems began to be seen also as a drag on economic growth, Hu and Wen responded with an array of ameliorative initiatives, with considerable confidence that the party-state possessed the administrative capability to make them work tolerably well (Duckett & Wang, 2017).…”

“…Under Jiang, taxes and informal fees had increased the burdens on rural dwellers (both poor and prosperous) as local governments became more predatory. That created dangerous tensions between cadres of the party-state and ordinary folk, and eroded the legitimacy of the regime (Duckett & Wang, 2017). Jiang's government had also paid too little attention to the distress of tens of millions of rural-urban migrants who posed a potential threat to public order (Howell, 2016).…”

“…In China, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took power in 2002-2003 after more than a decade in which Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji's administration had emphasised economic growth with an urban bias. That led to increasing economic inequality, a relative neglect of rural areas and of the plight of poor people (rural and urban), and mounting collective protests over injustices (see Duckett & Wang, 2017). Hu and Wen countered with an array of new initiatives that extended programmes to disadvantaged groups and lifted the onerous tax burden on rural dwellers.…”