Why Did State-Building Policy Fail in Afghanistan?

Abstract

Afghan state collapse in August 2021 once again put discussion about state-building strategies in post-conflict scenarios. This article explores fundamental causes of state-building failure in Afghanistan and proposes an explanation based, for one side, on policy inability to generate internal legitimacy and local ownership necessary for State consolidation and sustainability born from military intervention in 2001; and for the other, in how war on terror interest vitiated Afghan transition course by subordinating democratic governance and economic reconstruction goals to security considerations. In this sense, article focuses its attention on three fundamental issues that ultimately doomed 20-year effort of state-building to failure: the way in which new state foundations were distorted to turn it into a neo-patrimonial pseudo-democracy, dependent and corrupt, and controlled it by an old and new warlords elite; the absence of a national reconstruction effective strategy for helping Afghan people to rebuild a country devastated by years of war, that would allow socializing peace benefits and strengthen central government authority in a traditionally fragmented and centrifugal society; and lastly, the geopolitical environment also generated by war on terror, which was not contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan and increased state-building shortcomings and failure chances.