Why Brokers Don't Betray: Social Status and Brokerage Activity in Central Java

Tawakkal, George Towar Ikbal; Kistanto, Nurdien Harry; Asy’ari, Hasyim; Pradhanawati, Ari; Garner, Andrew

doi:10.1080/00927678.2017.1307641

Cited by 15 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…7 The use of brokers to distribute goods to voters is common across the world and the prominent theories of brokerage activity underscore their central importance to the practice of vote buying (Stokes 2005;Stokes, Dunning, and Nazareno 2013;Aspinall 2014;Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016). Campaigns do not simply hire brokers as couriers to deliver these goods, however (Tawakkal et al 2017b). Instead, most candidates seek out brokers because they are community leaders (religious leaders, business owners, village elders, etc.)…”

Section: S O C I a L P R E S S U R E -C O M M U N I T Y L E A D E R Smentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As discussed above, candidates often seek out prominent community leaders, including business owners, to work as brokers in their campaigns (for additional examples of business owners as brokers, see Scott 1972;Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004;Gingerich and Medina 2013;and Hellmann 2014). This practice is especially common throughout Central Java, where candidates recruit business owners precisely because of their influence over the workers in their businesses (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016;Tawakkal et al 2017b). Moreover, many of the business owners who operate as "brokers" in the campaign hired workers and managers from their businesses to oversee the distribution of money to voters.…”

Section: S O C I a L P R E S S U R E -C O M M U N I T Y L E A D E R Smentioning

confidence: 99%

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Voting Their Conscience: Poverty, Education, Social Pressure and Vote Buying in Indonesia

Pradhanawati¹,

Tawakkal²,

Garner³

2018

J. East Asian Stud.

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When citizens are offered cash and gifts by candidates, they can either vote for candidates offering the money, refuse the money, or take the money and vote for whichever candidate they prefer (e.g., “vote their conscience”). Which citizens “vote their conscience” versus the other options available to them? This manuscript examines the effect of poverty, education, and social pressure on how citizens in the Central Java city of Semarang, Indonesia react to offers of cash from politicians. We find that poverty and education interact to create important and interesting patterns of responses. The citizens most likely to “vote their conscience” are those with lower income yet higher levels of formal education whereas higher income, more highly educated citizens are most likely to refuse the money. We also examine factors that create social pressure for citizens to “sell” their votes by supporting the candidates offering cash.

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Section: S O C I a L P R E S S U R E -C O M M U N I T Y L E A D E R Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: S O C I a L P R E S S U R E -C O M M U N I T Y L E A D E R Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting Their Conscience: Poverty, Education, Social Pressure and Vote Buying in Indonesia

Pradhanawati¹,

Tawakkal²,

Garner³

2018

J. East Asian Stud.

Self Cite

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“…(2017), Rodrigo Zarazaga (2014), Aspinall (2014) dan Ravanilla et al (2017). Towar et al (2017) dalam penelitiannya menjelaskan begitu penting memilih broker dengan reputasi baik dalam sebuah komunitas. Reputasi baik yang dimiliki seorang makelar suara mampu menjadi mekanisme yang dipercayai masyarakat dengan segala janji yang telah diucapkan ketika sedang melakukan kampanye.…”

Section: Pendahuluanunclassified

“…Mekanisme yang mendorong kiai melakukan kesetiaan kepada kandidat adalah status sosial yang dimiliki kiai tidak mungkin dihancurkan hanya karena persoalan materi. Sesuai dengan pendapat Towar et al (2017) bahwa reputasi yang dimiliki orang baik dalam komunitas tidak akan dihancurkan sekalipun tawaran finansial sangat besar. Dengan demikian kandidat tidak akan khawatir atas pengkhianatan yang akan dilakukan oleh kiai.…”

Section: Efektivitas Kiai Sebagai Makelar Suaraunclassified

“…Sebagai pialang tentu kiai juga tidak sembarang dalam memilih orang apalagi berkaitan dengan persoalan materi. Mengingat bahwa praktik ini bersifat ilegal dan tidak ada kontrak resmi untuk menuntut jika materi tidak tersampaikan maka pemilihan pialang yang tidak memiliki status sosial tinggi akan beresiko untuk berkhianat (Towar et al, 2017). Oleh karena itu, kiai memilih bejingan sebagai pialang mengingat bejingan memiliki status sosial tinggi di bawah kiai.…”

Section: Efektivitas Kiai Sebagai Makelar Suaraunclassified

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Religion, Political Contestation and Democracy: Kiai's Role as Vote Broker in Madurese Local Political Battle

2021

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This study aimed to know how the kiai as religious figures who had the highest social status in Pamekasan Regency carried out their work as vote brokers. This study was a qualitative research with a case study method. The research depended on verbal data and information of vote raising done by public figures in a Madurese local election. Intensive interview with some kiai as the key informants was done to get the intended information. They were chosen as primary data sources because they were public religious figures whom the people adhere to. The result showed that kiai with their social capital as vote brokers mobilizing the masses properly attracted political bosses who competed in the local election. Kiai with their religiosity played as an intermediary in delivering material for intended voters. However, it was unethical when the kiai as a religious figure provided material for voters. As a local figure who has a good image in a community, kiai became a major element in the progress of the democratic process. It can be concluded that the kiai as a highly respected religious figure contributed to the democracy to be well organized in the future.

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Brokers betrayed: The afterlife of Afghan interpreters employed by western armies

Jong

2022

J of Intl Development

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Brokers have long been under scrutiny for their purported disloyalty, but brokers' attachments to and expectations of the parties they mediate for, remain largely neglected. This article contributes to existing scholarship on brokerage by reversing the much-discussed theme of betrayal by brokers, focussing instead on betrayal of brokers. It maps three forms of betrayal -interpersonal; institutional and ideologicaldrawing on unique empirical material, including interviews with Afghan interpreters who worked for Western armies. It argues that the betrayal of brokers is facilitated by conditions of reduced demand and weak social ties in an unequal global order. In cases where the brokers' remit is largely dictated by the patron, brokers stand more to lose than to gain.

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Why Brokers Don't Betray: Social Status and Brokerage Activity in Central Java

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Voting Their Conscience: Poverty, Education, Social Pressure and Vote Buying in Indonesia

Voting Their Conscience: Poverty, Education, Social Pressure and Vote Buying in Indonesia

Religion, Political Contestation and Democracy: Kiai's Role as Vote Broker in Madurese Local Political Battle

Brokers betrayed: The afterlife of Afghan interpreters employed by western armies

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