Who Runs at the Top of Party Lists? Determinants of Parties’ List Ranking in the 2013 German Bundestag Election

Ceyhan, Sara

doi:10.1080/09644008.2017.1320391

Cited by 16 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…This average—which encompasses for example military dictators, who have less political experience, and monarchs, who can access power at a very young age—masks important variations, and it probably takes longer to enter government in most democracies. For example, the average German MP has been a party member for some 17 years before entering parliament for the first time (Ceyhan, 2018); it would take this individual another 15 years on average to become a minister (Bailer & Ohmura, 2018). In France, ministers—most of which have served several terms as parliamentarians prior to their nomination—are in the beginning of their fifties when they take office (Grossmann and François, 2013).…”

Section: The Longevity Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The fact that top leadership positions are more likely to be filled by experienced politicians can result from a selection effect (i.e., political survival reflects the quality of politicians) or from long‐term skill acquisition (i.e., quality gradually improves with experience). However, several studies on candidate selection (Ceyhan, 2018 on Germany; Chiru & Popescu, 2017 on Romania; Put, Muyters, & Maddens, 2020 on Belgium) show that placement of candidates in closed‐list PR systems improves with the number of their prior candidacies, irrespective of their past electoral success. These findings strongly suggest that the time spent in politics is in fact valued as signal of loyalty to the party (Ceyhan, 2018; Put et al, 2020).…”

Section: The Longevity Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Gerontocracy in a comparative perspective: Explaining why political leaders are (almost always) older than their constituents

Magni-Berton

Panel

2020

Sociology Compass

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Gerontocracy, in its narrowest sense, refers to political systems ruled by elderly people, whether de jure or de facto. Although formal gerontocratic rules are progressively disappearing, contemporary political systems are still governed by individuals who are significantly older than the mean voter. This article reviews existing explanations for the prevalence of gerontocracy. To summarize main findings, gerontocracy cannot be explained by the leadership qualities of older rulers: aging leaders do not perform better in office and voters seem to be aware of it. Instead, existing research suggests that gerontocracy can be explained by strategic considerations. In autocracies, the selectorate tends to choose aging leaders in order to reduce their expected tenure length. In democracies, voters are more likely to select experienced candidates, which they expect to be more effective at advancing the interests of their constituency: this premium put on experience mechanically lengthens political careers and increases the age of the average politician. Finally, older voters, which participate more in politics, tend to prefer older politicians, because they (correctly) expect them to better defend their own interests.

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Section: The Longevity Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Longevity Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gerontocracy in a comparative perspective: Explaining why political leaders are (almost always) older than their constituents

Magni-Berton

Panel

2020

Sociology Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…We expect, however, that a parliamentarian’s seniority has effects on the cooperation efforts that go beyond fellow parliamentarians in their parliamentary party. The acquisition of policy expertise and getting to know the political game takes time (Ceyhan, 2017; Mickler, 2013). This is also true for the development of a reputation as a trustful cooperation partner who is attractive for other political actors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in networks: Political parties and interest groups in EU policy-making in Germany

Wonka

Haunss

2019

European Union Politics

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Political actors cooperate with each other to share resources and to organize political support. In this article, we describe and explain such cooperative behavior in European Union policy-making by analyzing the information networks that parliamentarians of the Bundestag entertain with other party politicians and with interest groups. First, we describe whom parliamentarians cooperate with to receive policy information. Subsequently, we identify different types of cooperation networks. Differences in the structure of these networks point to a political division of labor inside political parties which is driven by the need to organize political support in policy-making. Finally, we test the explanatory power of individual attributes, institutional positions and (shared) political interests to account for the structure of parliamentarians’ cooperation networks. While formal positions and party ideology generally shape parliamentarians’ cooperation, their relative importance varies across different types of networks. The article contributes theoretically to informational theories of interest group politics and to the literature on national legislators’ behavior in EU policy-making.

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“…This is a powerful variable that makes this study well controlled. A number of studies have demonstrated that the viability of a listed candidate is largely determined by the candidate's political background, including incumbency status, number of prior candidacies, district nominations, and so on (Ceyhan 2018; Gherghina and Chiru 2010; Górecki and Kukołowicz 2014; Kunovich 2003; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). Therefore, the rank on the list variable further improves control for the political biographies of candidates.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Open-list PR systems are interesting not only because they provide opportunities to re-order the party lists but also because they place “extraordinary information demands” on voters, who are given the opportunity to single out particular candidates that they prefer (Matland and Lilliefeldt 2014; Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier 2015). On the other hand, the party leadership determines the specific order of candidates on the list, which sends a signal about each candidate's quality (Ceyhan 2018; Gherghina and Chiru 2010) and the party's preferences. These cues may be particularly important in many CEE countries, including Lithuania, where there is a low level of public familiarity with candidates because of the fluidity of their political systems (Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier 2015).…”

Section: Research Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Party-Determined Viability and Gender Bias in Open-List Proportional Representation Systems

Ragauskas¹

2019

Pol & Gen

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Using individual-level data from three Lithuanian legislative elections (2008, 2012, 2016), this article investigates voter bias in an open-list proportional representation system in which parties rank candidates but voters are able to fully influence the rank order through preferential voting. This study examines the average effects of and variation in gender bias among voters of different parties. Most importantly, it also investigates how party cues interact with gender cues—that is, whether discriminatory tendencies vary by a candidate's party-determined viability. After establishing that there is no evidence of elite bias in favor of or against women candidates, with the exception of the Social Democrats and a few other parties, I demonstrate that, on average, female Lithuanian politicians receive approximately 7% fewer preferential votes than their male counterparts. In addition, the models predict that gender bias is most pronounced against the female candidates who are best placed to enter parliament. Finally, I demonstrate that Social Democratic voters are, on average, the most undisposed toward female candidates, correcting for positive elite bias toward female candidates from the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, while voters of the Homeland Union party (conservatives) strongly prefer women politicians.

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Who Runs at the Top of Party Lists? Determinants of Parties’ List Ranking in the 2013 German Bundestag Election

Cited by 16 publications

References 41 publications

Gerontocracy in a comparative perspective: Explaining why political leaders are (almost always) older than their constituents

Gerontocracy in a comparative perspective: Explaining why political leaders are (almost always) older than their constituents

Cooperation in networks: Political parties and interest groups in EU policy-making in Germany

Party-Determined Viability and Gender Bias in Open-List Proportional Representation Systems

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