Who joins counter-hegemonic IGOs? Early and late members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Abstract

What makes states join intergovernmental organizations intended to challenge a hegemon? The China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), founded in June 2015, targets the primacy of the US-led Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the Asia-Pacific region, and is a crucial case for answering this question. I argue that early AIIB members are likely to be politically distant from the US in both international and domestic terms. In contrast, subsequent states seeking AIIB membership include democratic states, existing ADB members and countries internationally aligned with the US, as measured by voting similarity at the United Nations General Assembly. Through logit models, I test these propositions and analyze which states adhered to the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding that signaled Beijing's willingness to form the Bank and which states joined the AIIB subsequently at its foundation in 2015. The results support my claim that early members tend to score low in democratic governance, while late members are US allies.

The Impact of China's AIIB on the World Bank

“…61.On the methodological discussion, see Liu, Wang, and Xu, 2022. On determinants of joining the AIIB, see Rodrigues Vieira 2018; Wang 2018.…”

Latin American agency: The New Development Bank, Uruguay's accession and Brazilian influence

“…An axiom of international law is that IGOs cannot exist without the members that join them (Droesse, 2020). Well-established international organizations like those of the North, which have global reach, have managed to expand without much effort, as they enjoy international prestige that excites countries about joining (Rodrigues Vieira, 2018). With smaller, newer organizations like the NDB, the task is more challenging and requires a clear strategy by the institution to be successful.…”