Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities

Ortoleva, Pietro; Safonov, Evgenii; Yariv, Leeat

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3918103

Cited by 1 publication

(3 citation statements)

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“…11 A similar assumption is made inTroyan (2012),Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014),Hafalir and Mirales (2015),Lien, Zheng, and Zhong (2017),Hafalir et al (2018),Akin (2019),Akbarpour, Kapor, Neilson, and Van Dijk (2022),Dogan andUyanik (2020), andOrtoleva et al (2021) among others.…”

mentioning

confidence: 66%

“…Dogan and Uyanik (2020) study a simplified version of Miralles (2012) and, like us, find that wasteful allocation rules might be optimal. Hafalir and Miralles (2015) and Ortoleva, Safonov, and Yariv (2021) consider models with a continuum of agents and find optimal mechanisms that have features similar to ours. Specifically, agents who have high valuations receive lotteries over objects where there is a large probability of receiving high-quality objects, but also a high probability of receiving low-quality objects, while agents with low valuations receive lotteries with a high probability of receiving average quality objects.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 80%

“…Even though agents have the same ordinal preferences over objects, the fact that they have different cardinal preferences leads to them having different preferences over lotteries of objects. Building on this insight, several authors have used mechanism design techniques to study the problem of finding welfare maximizing incentive compatible allocation rules in settings where agents have common ordinal preferences (Miralles (2012), Hafalir and Miralles (2015), Dogan and Uyanik (2020), Ortoleva, Safonov, and Yariv (2021)).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification

Pereyra

Silva

2023

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Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high‐quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social planner is unable to use transfers to give incentives for agents to convey their private information. Instead, she is able to imperfectly verify their reports through signals that are positively affiliated with each agent's type. We characterize mechanisms that maximize the social planner's expected payoff. In the optimal mechanism, each agent chooses one of various tracks, which are characterized by two thresholds. If the agent's signal exceeds the upper threshold of the chosen track, the agent receives a high‐quality object, if it is between the two thresholds, he receives a low‐quality object, and if it is below the lower threshold, he receives no object.

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