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This paper considers a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. Inspired by this situation, we introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, agents are allowed either to retain their current position or to choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a fair matching always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure.JEL classification numbers: C71; C78; D71; D78; I28

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Strong checks and balances aimed at protecting citizens from government abuse of power are key features of well-performing democracies. Nevertheless, some presidents have enjoyed strong and often explicit popular support when they undermined these controls. We present a formal model of the trade-off between control on the executive and delegation to analyse voters' decisions on the strength of checks and balances. We argue that voters may support their loosening, even when this allows rent extraction, if they are convinced that checks on the executive are blocking necessary reforms. We discuss several cases of strong presidents in Latin America who, alleging that radical reforms were necessary, obtained popular support that allowed them to loosen checks on the executive. Some of these presidents had a pro-market and some an anti-market reform agenda so, as our model suggests, voters' willingness to remove checks and balances can emerge under both right-and left-wing executives.

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This paper studies the determinants of repeat visiting in Uruguay, where loyal visitors are a relevant part of the total. From a statistical point of view the number of times a visitor has been to a place constitutes count data. In this regard available information on Uruguay present relevant limitations. Count data is in fact reported only for those who visited the country up to five times, whereas records about the most frequent visitors are collapsed into one residual category. This implies that the classic models for count data such as Poisson or negative binomial cannot be put into consideration. The paper suggest instead the use of a quantile count data regression, that is a model based on measures of location rather than mean values. A set of explanatory variables related to socioeconomic characteristics, features of the journey and composition of the travel party are considered.

We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an agent may make an early offer because she is concerned that others are making early offers. Yet other agents make early offers because they are concerned that others worry about early offers, and so on and so forth. The end result is that any given agent is more likely to make an early offer than a late offer.