Which witch is which? Exotic objects and intentional identity

Sandgren, Alexander

doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1237-3

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…These theories of co-aboutness face significant underdetermination problems of roughly the kind discussed earlier (Thomasson 1996(Thomasson , 1999Sandgren 2018). This should not be surprising if my diagnosis of underdetermination puzzles is correct and given the interplay between the two puzzles discussed earlier.…”

Section: Co-aboutness Againmentioning

confidence: 56%

Turning Aboutness About

Sandgren

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and terms themselves).

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Section: Co-aboutness Againmentioning

confidence: 56%

Turning Aboutness About

Sandgren

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“… Everett (2013, 179‐188) and Sandgren () develop a similar point. Priest (, 141‐2) averts the concern by taking the relevant aboutness as primitive; like Manning (, 295) and Sandgren (, §6.2), I find this too methodologically implausible to accept. …”

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confidence: 83%

“…As Manning (, 281‐2) observes, the issues we will be dealing with are equally created by sentences lacking the semantically problematic anaphoric links in (4), like this: Nabokov and the critic argue about the same character ; cf. also Sandgren (), §1. Maier () offers a nice DRT formal account of the semantics of the relevant attitude adscriptions compatible with the philosophical account provided here.…”

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confidence: 93%

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names

García‐Carpintero

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Stacie Friend raises a problem of "co-identification" involving fictional names such as 'Hamlet' or 'Odysseus': how to explain judgments that different uses of these names are "about the same object", on the assumption of irrealism about fictional characters on which such expressions do not refer. To deal with this issue, she contrasts a Kripke-inspired "name-centric" approach, pursued among others by Sainsbury, with an Evans-inspired "info-centric" approach, which she prefers. The approach is motivated by her rejection of descriptivist ways of dealing with the problem. In this paper, I rely on the presuppositional, referencefixing form of descriptivism I favor for the semantics of names, and I explain how it helps us deal with Friend's problem, which I take to concern primarily the semantic contribution of names to ascriptions of representational content to fictions. The result is a form of the "name-centric" sort of approach that Friend rejects, which can (I'll argue) stand her criticisms.

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“…What is more, accounts according to which intentional identity is explained (in cases in which the representations are empty) by the presence of some exotic object that both representations are about face a unique challenge, recently em-phasized by Sandgren (2018). 9 Sandgren's challenge is based on the observation that the collection of exotic objects often has an uncomfortably large cardinality.…”

Section: Holding True Optionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality

Clutton¹,

Sandgren²

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Phenomenal intentionality theories have recently enjoyed significant attention. According to these theories, the intentionality of a mental representation (what it is about) crucially depends on its phenomenal features. We present a new puzzle for these theories, involving a phenomenon called 'intentional identity', or 'cointentionality'. Co-intentionality is a ubiquitous intentional phenomenon that involves tracking things even when there is no concrete thing being tracked. We suggest that phenomenal intentionality theories need to either develop new uniquely phenomenal resources for handling the puzzle, or restrict their explanatory ambitions.

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Which witch is which? Exotic objects and intentional identity

Cited by 11 publications

References 33 publications

Turning Aboutness About

Turning Aboutness About

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names

A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality

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