A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality

Abstract

Phenomenal intentionality theories have recently enjoyed significant attention. According to these theories, the intentionality of a mental representation (what it is about) crucially depends on its phenomenal features. We present a new puzzle for these theories, involving a phenomenon called 'intentional identity', or 'cointentionality'. Co-intentionality is a ubiquitous intentional phenomenon that involves tracking things even when there is no concrete thing being tracked. We suggest that phenomenal intentionality theories need to either develop new uniquely phenomenal resources for handling the puzzle, or restrict their explanatory ambitions.

Turning Aboutness About

“…These views, which are typically grouped under the umbrella of 'phenomenal intentionality theories', center on the intrinsic phenomenal features of individual representations in their treatment of intentionality. For a recent discussion of how phenomenal intentionality theories relate to questions of coaboutness, refer to Clutton and Sandgren (2019). 4 For a discussion of the view that aboutness is narrow, refer to Farkas (2008).…”