Which personality fits personalized representation?

Rahat

2019

Party Politics

Self Cite

Our aim is to propose guidelines for the analysis of political personalization and personalized politics in general and for behavioural personalization in particular. The first guideline is based on our understanding that personalization comes at the cost of party politics. It suggests that in order to classify politics as more or less personalized, we must compare it to an alternative party-oriented politics. Based on a synthesis of existing theoretical work, the second guideline suggests three analytical dimensions to clarify the multidimensional concept of personalization: arena, level and character. Arena refers to where personalization takes place; level refers to whose power or independence is changing; and character refers to how personalization is manifested. Furthermore, we present the contributions of this symposium and explain how they follow the two guidelines and advance our understanding and knowledge of behavioural political personalization.

Section: Classification Steps: Arena Level and Charactermentioning

confidence: 99%

Political personalization and personalized politics within and beyond the behavioural arena

Rahat

2019

Party Politics

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“…The spill-over effect of cost of ruling: Consequences for legislative behaviour Legislators' votes in parliament are shaped by multiple considerations. They vote according to their personal convictions, often rooted in their demographic background, personality traits or ideological dispositions (Baumann et al, 2015;Bøggild et al, 2021), and they vote according to the party line to maintain or advance their position within the party (Cox & McCubbins, 1993;Faas, 2003;Slapin et al, 2018;Strøm, 2012). Political parties hold control mechanisms, including campaign finances, candidate selection and the power to assign committee and cabinet positions, to enforce discipline among its members (Bøggild & Pedersen, 2018;Cox & McCubbins, 1993;Kam, 2009;Martin, 2014b).…”

Section: The Cost Of Ruling: Concept and Downstream Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The legislative cost of ruling: Voter punishment of governing parties fuels legislator party dissent

Bøggild

European J Political Res

2023

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Political parties in office generally incur a cost of ruling among the electorate. This article considers the broader implications of this phenomenon for democratic governance. We argue that the electoral cost a party incurs in office entails that its individual legislators become more inclined to vote against the party line as a way to distance themselves from the deteriorating party brand. We test and support several observable implications of this argument using time series data including all members of parliament in the British parliament between 1992 and 2015 coupled with monthly opinion poll data. The well‐established electoral cost of ruling thus translates into a legislative cost of ruling by reducing incumbent party legislators’ loyalty to the party line. We discuss how the legislative cost of ruling complicates effective governance but may also strengthen democratic accountability by reducing legislative capacity of governing parties that have lost their electoral mandate.

“…or (3) as party delegates striving to promote the party program and respond to party preferences. This typology is still widely used in the study of politicians' behaviour (Dudzinska et al 2014; André et al 2015; Bøggild et al forthcoming). One of its benefits is that it clearly and directly nails the dilemmas politicians may face when acting as responsive representatives.…”

Section: Preferences For Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mismatched Preferences for Responsiveness: Danish Voters and Politicians

2020

Scand Pol Stud

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Responsiveness is key in democratic systems and can be perceived as a continuous interaction between voters and politicians. However, only limited research has studied the alignment or potential mismatch between voter and politician preferences regarding responsiveness. This article examines how voters' and politicians' preferences for responsiveness differ and suggests reasons for the identified differences. It proposes two factors leading to different preferences: recruitment of highly educated politicians and party-organised elite politics. Using survey data collected among Danish voters, candidates and MPs, the article documents a mismatch between politicians' and voters' preferences for responsiveness: politicians prefer party responsiveness, while voters prefer constituency responsiveness. In line with expectations, voters with a shorter education have stronger preferences for constituency responsiveness, while incumbent MPs are even more party-oriented than challenger candidates. These findings highlight potential troublesome consequences of the increasingly educational-elitist recruitment and continued party organisation of legislative politics for the representative relationship between voters and politicians.