Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation

Abstract

This article develops a change-point model of democratic consolidation that conceives of consolidation as a latent quality to be inferred rather than measured directly. Consolidation is hypothesized to occur when a large, durable, and statistically significant decline in the risk of democratic breakdowns occurs at a well-defined point during a democracy's lifetime. This approach is applied to new data on democratic survival that distinguish between breakdowns due to military coups and incumbent takeovers. We find that the risk of an authoritarian reversal by either process differs both in its temporal dynamic and determinants. Crucially, new democracies consolidate against the risk of coups but not incumbent takeovers, suggesting that distinct mechanisms account for the vulnerability of new democracies to these alternative modes of breakdown.

A new political system model: Semi‐parliamentary government

“…Electoral accountability requires the president's re‐electability, but allowing (immediate) re‐election increases incumbency advantage and may reinforce executive power accumulation. Empirical studies suggest that this accumulation creates a greater and persistent threat of authoritarian takeover by the incumbent, relative to parliamentary and semi‐parliamentary systems (Svolik ). Functional alternatives to term limits are not easy to find (Ginsburg et al.…”

“…; Linz : 12). Popularly elected chief executives weaken parties’ unity and programmatic capacities (Carey ; Samuels & Shugart ); and while they may not increase the overall risk of democratic breakdown (Cheibub ), they do seem to pose a persistent threat of authoritarian takeover by the incumbent president (Maeda ; Svolik ).…”

Varieties of contemporary democratic breakdown and regression: A comparative analysis

“…Several empirical analyses have been conducted with regard to this phenomenon, including Berg‐Schlosser and Mitchell () on the interwar period, and Fish (, ) on the role of constitutional engineering and ‘superpresidentialism’ in postcommunist countries. Similarly, Svolik () examined incumbent takeovers or coups d’état (see also Bermeo ) from 1945 to 1990. The central insight is that the presence of a strong government facing little control may be a key factor for regression and breakdown.…”

“…In their study on African states, Slater et al. () showed how weak, unconsolidated democracies are more likely to backslide (see also Svolik ; Goldstone et al. ).…”

Putinism, Populism and the Defence of Liberal Democracy

“…Scholars have long argued that while new democracies are prone to some backsliding risk, those that are establishedgoing on two decades, say -should be safe. 14 Some see populism as any political movement that seeks popular support, and perhaps panders to it with promises that either will not be fulfilled or can only be fulfilled at long-term cost. By their definitions, this does not imply a particular political ideology and can refer to progressive political movements.…”