A new political system model: Semi‐parliamentary government

Abstract

Abstract. Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system that mirrors semipresidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it establishes a branch-based separation of powers and can balance the 'majoritarian' and 'proportional' visions of democracy without concentrating executive power in a single individual. This article analyses bicameral versions of semi-parliamentary government in Australia and Japan, and compares empirical patterns of democracy in the Australian Commonwealth as well as New South Wales to 20 advanced parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. It discusses new semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require formal bicameralism, and pays special attention to semi-parliamentary options for democratising the European Union.

Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism: patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies

“…What we need, in our view, is a parsimonious typology that includes the five established types and the Australian case in a systematic manner. We believe that these goals are achieved by Ganghof's (2014Ganghof's ( , 2017 proposal, a slightly modified version of which is shown in Table 1. Table 1 uses the two established dimensions for classifying executive-legislative systems -the origin and survival of the cabinet -but accounts for the fact that the executive may only be partially dependent on a directly elected assembly.…”

“…Strengthening the goals of simple majoritarianism would require a more farreaching reform of lower houses. If constituency representation were shifted into a bigger upper house, lower house elections could be held in a single system-wide district, based on absolute majority rule, and seats awarded only to the two parties with the strongest voter support (for details, see Ganghof 2016aGanghof , 2017. Such a system would mimic presidential elections in that it would guarantee a two-party system and identifiable one-party cabinets.…”

“…This article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executivelegislative system, a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government, which we call 'semi-parliamentary government' (Ganghof 2017). We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a specific balance between competing models or visions of democracy (cf.…”

“…In doing so, it follows the recent literature on executive-legislative systems (Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg 2014;Elgie 2011). Yet legislative veto power is certainly important and figures prominently in the ideal-typical definition of semi-parliamentarism (Ganghof 2017). This definition focuses on the democratic logic of delegation embodied in an executive-legislative system.…”

“…The 'confidence college' for the cabinet would then not be a separate chamber but a large committee of parliament. The right to participate in a no-confidence vote could be reserved for parties that pass some legal vote share threshold or for single-member district representatives in a mixed member electoral system (Ganghof 2016a(Ganghof , 2017.…”