Whether to Delay the Release of eBooks or Not? An Analysis of Optimal Publishing Strategies for Book Publishers

Li, Fan; Li, Shengli; Gu, Jiarong

doi:10.4067/s0718-18762019000200110

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In a natural experiment conducted by Chen et al. (2019), when e‐books are popular in past years, delaying e‐books only hurts the sales volumes of e‐books but leads no increase in p‐books. Thus, when consumers prefer e‐books, the simultaneous is more profitable.…”

Section: Results and Insightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Li et al. (2019a) claim that the publisher should delay the format with less market potential. Early studies have shown that when inventory is short, consumers may turn to different variants of the same brand (Emmelhainz et al., 1991).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the publication industry, digital formats may be delayed to avoid the cannibalization of traditional paperbacks. Li et al (2019a) claim that the publisher should delay the format with less market potential. Early studies have shown that when inventory is short, consumers may turn to different variants of the same brand (Emmelhainz et al, 1991).…”

Section: The Distribution Sequence Researches Of Digital Goodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How the agency contract fails in hybrid mode: agency fees and distribution sequences

Shu

Xiao

Cao

2023

Int Trans Operational Res

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We consider a supplier selling substituted products to an e‐retailer through wholesale selling mode or mixed use of wholesale and agency selling mode (hybrid contracts). This paper explains the curious failure of the agency model and investigates the contract selection problem. We build the stylized models that consider consumer formats preferences and distribution sequence. We find that an excessively high agency fee can lead to failure but this is on the condition of substituted products simultaneously distributed. However, we find no failure phenomenon in sequential distribution scenarios. Because it is optimal to mark down the price of the delayed product that prevents inefficiency with a lower price in the agency model than in the wholesale model. Furthermore, in the e‐books industry, when consumers prefer digital (traditional) formats, the equilibrium strategy is that the e‐retailer claims a low agency fee, and the supplier chooses simultaneous (sequential) distribution through hybrid contracts. Besides, the equilibrium is robust.

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Section: Results and Insightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Distribution Sequence Researches Of Digital Goodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How the agency contract fails in hybrid mode: agency fees and distribution sequences

Shu

Xiao

Cao

2023

Int Trans Operational Res

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“…Specifically, Hua, et al [3] first investigate the impact of e-books on the publishers' distribution channel choices. Li, et al [21] and Li, et al [22] examine the publisher's pricing and launch strategies and discover the publisher's publishing sequence is related to the market potential. Chen and Tang [23] formulate a model to analyze the selfpublishing model.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Analysis of the Pricing Mechanisms in an Online Book Supply Chain in the Presence of Reference Price Effects

Hou¹,

Zeng²

2021

JTAER

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(1) Background: A binding recommended retail price has been used in several markets in a variety of forms, and the book market is a typical example. Publishers sell books to online retailers at a unit wholesale discount computed on the cover price. Retailers are then allowed to set the retail price. Therefore, if consumers regard the cover prices as reference points, then they may be more likely to purchase books if retail prices are lower than the cover prices. (2) Methods: We develop a Stackelberg game model for a book supply chain to investigates how reference price effects affect retailers and publisher’s pricing strategies. (3) Results: The results show that retailers will sell printed books at a discount only when the publisher’s wholesale discount rate is not high. Further, as the intensity of the reference price effects increases, (a) the lower boundary of the wholesale discount rate rises, (b) publishers’ profits increase and (c) retailers’ profits increase relative to the level of consumers’ e-books acceptance. (4) Conclusions: This result is related to the fact that the online retailer, such as Amazon and JD.com, like to invoke reference price effects in consumers’ minds by highlighting the printed book’s discount rate.

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“…They examined the impacts of online-offline channel integration on purchase decisions and found that the integrated dual-channel approach can improve competitive advantage. Li et al [8] studied one monopolistic publisher with both physical and electronic channels. They found that by coordinating the sale times and prices for the different channels, the profits of publishers could be effectively enhanced.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy Decision

Zhang

Xia

Shi

2021

JTAER

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The main research question asked in this paper is whether and when a dual-channel retailer (retailer in short) should adopt the “buy online and pick up in store” (BOPS) strategy. To answer this question, we first derive the optimal price decision using the non-BOPS and BOPS strategies. Subsequently, we compare the performance of retailers under non-BOPS and BOPS scenarios. Our main findings are that under the monopoly scenario, retailers may not always benefit from the BOPS strategy. Retailers will benefit only if the offline operational costs are low and the degree of customer acceptance of the online channel is high. However, the BOPS strategy cannot improve dual-channel retailers’ market share. Furthermore, under a Stackelberg game scenario with e-retailers as leaders, when the value of a product is medium and the transaction costs of the offline channel are high, retailers can use the BOPS strategy to enhance their market share. If the degree of customer acceptance of the online channel is also high, retailers can further improve their profits by using the BOPS strategy. Overall, these findings not only provide decision support for retailers, but also enrich the theories on dual-channel retailing in operations management.

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Whether to Delay the Release of eBooks or Not? An Analysis of Optimal Publishing Strategies for Book Publishers

Cited by 7 publications

References 22 publications

How the agency contract fails in hybrid mode: agency fees and distribution sequences

How the agency contract fails in hybrid mode: agency fees and distribution sequences

Strategic Analysis of the Pricing Mechanisms in an Online Book Supply Chain in the Presence of Reference Price Effects

The Dual-Channel Retailer’s Channel Synergy Strategy Decision

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