The main research question asked in this paper is whether and when a dual-channel retailer (retailer in short) should adopt the “buy online and pick up in store” (BOPS) strategy. To answer this question, we first derive the optimal price decision using the non-BOPS and BOPS strategies. Subsequently, we compare the performance of retailers under non-BOPS and BOPS scenarios. Our main findings are that under the monopoly scenario, retailers may not always benefit from the BOPS strategy. Retailers will benefit only if the offline operational costs are low and the degree of customer acceptance of the online channel is high. However, the BOPS strategy cannot improve dual-channel retailers’ market share. Furthermore, under a Stackelberg game scenario with e-retailers as leaders, when the value of a product is medium and the transaction costs of the offline channel are high, retailers can use the BOPS strategy to enhance their market share. If the degree of customer acceptance of the online channel is also high, retailers can further improve their profits by using the BOPS strategy. Overall, these findings not only provide decision support for retailers, but also enrich the theories on dual-channel retailing in operations management.
In this paper, we make a major contribution by examining an agricultural supplier's online sale mode choice. That is, for the supplier, which online sale mode should be adopted, his own online store, an online retailer, or a bricks-and-clicks retailer? To end this, we first study the price decisions under the three kinds of possible online sale modes. We then compare the price decisions among these modes. We find that when the supplier adopts his own online store, the online and offline price are both lowest in these modes. Based on it, we compare the supplier's profits and find that the mode of adopting his own online store can always lead the supplie r to get higher performance. That is, if the supplier has the ability to operate his own online store, he'd better set up his own online store. Lastly, we use numerical examples to illustrate our analytic findings and gain more insights.
This paper mainly focuses on the supplier and retailer how to deal with the supply disruption when it has happened. To end this, we establish a model which consists of a retailer, a supplier and a spot market. To get benchmark, we first investigate optimal decisions under the normal situation. Subsequently, we study the situation of supply disruption and get optimal decision of replenishment under two scenarios: centralized supply chain and decentralized supply chain. Comparing these results, we then find that the replenishment decision under decentralized supply chain is not consistent with that under centralized supply chain in most cases. It implies that supplier makes replenishment decision just according to her own situation which may undermine the supply chain's profits. To solve this issue, we finally develop a subsidy mechanism to achieve supply chain coordination and get the feasible range of parameter to lead win-win outcomes under supply disruption situation.
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