When Simple Voting Doesn’t Work: Multicameral Systems for the Representation and Aggregation of Interests in International Organizations

Abstract

This article analyses the origins and consequences of multicameral representation and voting in international organizations. It is argued that the existence of visible and durable conflicts in an issue area can make standard procedures such as unicameral majority voting ineffective with respect to the functioning of the regime. Applying spatial models of strategic decision making, it is asserted that multicameralism is more likely to be effective than unicameralism if chambers consist of key groups with distinct interests. Empirical evidence is provided by studying the multicameral voting rule in the Council of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). I compare likely decision-making outcomes under unicameral and multicameral voting rules from 1996 to 2002 and find that multicameral outcomes are more likely to be stable and supported by those actors critical for the effective functioning of the regime.

Sequential legislative lobbying

“…This voting system leads to some under-representation of the developing and transition countries and have been criticized on several grounds. Some new voting rules have been suggested (Bräuninger (2003), Hirokawa and Vlach (2006), Leech (2002), Morgan (2007), O'Neill and Peleg (2000), Rapkin and Strand (2006)). It would be useful to evaluate the hurdle factors and least cores of these new alternative schemes.…”

“…One important conclusion is that these prices have little to do with the power of a legislator as calculated through either the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf (1965), (1968)) or the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik (1954)). This suggests that the axiomatic theory of power measurement may not be fully 7 relevant to predict the payo¤s of the players in a game like this one 8 , where complete preference information and a speci…c game form are assumed.…”

Musings About the EU's Constitutional Future

“…The first element discussed by some of the economists as "constitutional engineers" suggests that the Commission should become an EU government, and that the Council of Ministers should become the second chamber in a truly bicameral system. Although a strong case could be made in favor of bicameral systems on the basis of recent theoretical (e.g., Tsebelis and Money 1997;Hammond and Gary 1987;Humphreys 2000;Bräuninger 2003) and empirical (e.g., Congleton 2003) work, more than one political scientist might frown on reading such a proposal, since in essence this is the way in which the EU currently operates in many areas. As Hix's (2005) introductory text shows, the Commission can be considered the equivalent of a government in many of its functions.…”

Accession and Reform of the European Union

“…Moreover, studies that depend on the location of the status quo have an extremely contingent character because the status quo may vary over time, particularly in cases where the location is determined by exogenous events (e.g crises). 11 QMV cores are calculated using the program LlMED (Brauninger, 2003).…”