When Is It Acceptable to Lie? Interpersonal and Intergroup Perspectives on Deception

Dunbar, Norah E.; Gangi, Katlyn; Coveleski, Samantha; Adams, Aubrie; Bernhold, Quinten S.; Giles, Howard

doi:10.1080/10510974.2016.1146911

Cited by 25 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…A significant correlation for both prosocial lies suggests that Walczyk et al's (2014) overarching hypothesis of a negative relationship between the EV of truth-telling and deciding to lie depends on who the lie benefits. In the context of prosocial lies where there is the intention to act for the benefit of another (Dunbar et al, 2016;Lavoie et al, 2016), it can be concluded that if a person decides to tell the truth, then another will primarily suffer the consequences. The cost to another, therefore, forms the basis for calculating the EV of truth-telling for prosocial lies and would explain why it is particularly important to consider in the decision-making process.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, an antisocial lie might include falsely telling your lecturer that your grandparent has passed away to be able to re-sit an exam. Other-oriented lies, also referred to as 'prosocial' or 'polite' lies, are perceived to be more socially tolerable than self-oriented lies because they aim to benefit others (Backbier, Hoogstraten, & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997;DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996;Dunbar et al, 2016). This preference for prosocial lies has also been found cross-culturally (Seiter, Bruschke, & Bai, 2002).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Exploring the decision component of the Activation‐Decision‐Construction‐Action Theory for different reasons to deceive

Cassidy

Wyman

Talwar

et al. 2018

Legal Criminol Psychol

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Objectives To explore how reasons to lie impact upon the decision component of Activation‐Decision‐Construction‐Action Theory. Design Specifically, the study looked at how beneficiary of the lie (self vs. another) and additional cost of lying (no cost vs. cost to self/other) might influence decisions to lie. Methods Ninety‐one undergraduate students read four hypothetical scenarios representing the four reasons to lie. They stated whether they would decide to tell the truth/lie for each scenario and also estimated the probability and valence of being believed, or not, if they did decide to tell the truth/lie. These estimations were inputted into the ADCAT formulae. Results Higher expected values of truth‐telling only reduced likelihood to decide to lie when the lie benefitted another. Beneficiary of the lie and additional cost together did not moderate any of the relationships between the ADCAT variables and hypothetical decisions to lie. However, the additional cost (e.g., to self or another) was a significant predictor of anticipated lying behaviour. The more likely there was a cost to self or other, the less likely the participants were to decide to lie. Conclusions Weighing up the expected cost and benefits of truth‐telling and lying was associated with hypothetical decisions to lie or not. However, other variables, such as additional cost to self or another, should be considered in the ADCAT model to extend our understanding of this decision‐making process. Future research is required to investigate whether these relationships can be manipulated to promote honesty and deter deceit.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the decision component of the Activation‐Decision‐Construction‐Action Theory for different reasons to deceive

Cassidy

Wyman

Talwar

et al. 2018

Legal Criminol Psychol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Thus, deception used to carry out RSEs can spark uncertainty, threaten a partner's trust, and represent morally repre-hensible behavior, while at the same time be intended to benefit the relationship. Although previous research has explored the motives (Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013) and acceptability (Dunbar et al, 2016) of deception in close relationships, there have been no investigations into process and outcomes of RSEs as a form of relational maintenance.…”

Section: Rses As a Unique Form Of Relational Maintenancementioning

confidence: 99%

Relational surprise experiences as a unique form of relational maintenance

2020

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This study presents an initial exploration and conceptualization of relational surprise experiences (RSEs) as communication phenomenon involving strategic relational maintenance behaviors with potential for positive and negative outcomes. University students in the Southeastern United States (N = 203) described a RSE that occurred with a close relational partner (romantic partner, friend, or family member), explained how deception was used to achieve the surprise, and reported relational benefits and drawbacks in an online survey. Seven types of RSEs were reported including gifts, events, visits, and destinations. Responses revealed that people considered surprises as relationally beneficial with minimal drawbacks. Although over one-third of the participants described their partner’s pants perceived the surprise as a violation of relational rules. Some participants reported both benefits and drawbacks to RSEs, thereby illuminating a nuance for traditional relational maintenance typologies. This study establishes a path to explore implications of RSEs for individual and relational satisfaction, happiness, and well-being.

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“…That is, SIT’s intergroup dynamics should translate to partisans considering the out-group deceptive and the in-group honest—regardless of a politician’s actual message content (Dunbar, 2017), while TDT’s focus on the truth bias similarly suggests a presumption of honesty from partisan group members. However, TDT’s extension of in-group truth bias leading to inaccurate appraisals of one’s own politician, and SIT’s emphasis on downplaying indiscretions from one’s own in-group while exaggerating malfeasance from the out-group (Dunbar et al, 2016) may also manifest as voters inaccurately detecting deception from their out-group politician. TDT posits that people will believe their in-group, and thus in the present political experiment partisan voters may be susceptible to deceit from their in-group politician.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…TDT also implies—in line with SIT—that people believe their in-group more than they believe their out-group. From the logic of TDT, and emboldened by recent work regarding intergroup deception (Dunbar, 2017; Dunbar et al, 2016), we would expect people to exhibit disbelief toward their out-group. TDT does not predict deception bias or lie bias, harping on the power of truth bias.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth Bias and Partisan Bias in Political Deception Detection

Clementson

2017

Journal of Language and Social Psychology

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This study tests the effects of political partisanship on voters’ perception and detection of deception. Based on social identity theory, in-group members should consider their politician’s message truthful while the opposing out-group would consider the message deceptive. Truth-default theory predicts that a salient in-group would be susceptible to deception from their in-group politician. In an experiment, partisan voters in the United States ( N = 618) watched a news interview in which a politician was labeled Democratic or Republican. The politician either answered all the questions or deceptively evaded a question. Results indicated that the truth bias largely prevailed. Voters were more likely to be accurate in their detection when the politician answered and did not dodge. Truth-default theory appears robust in a political setting, as truth bias holds (as opposed to deception bias). Accuracy in detection also depends on group affiliation. In-groups are accurate when their politician answers, and inaccurate when he dodges. Out-groups are more accurate than in-groups when a politician dodges, but still exhibit truth bias.

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When Is It Acceptable to Lie? Interpersonal and Intergroup Perspectives on Deception

Cited by 25 publications

References 38 publications

Exploring the decision component of the Activation‐Decision‐Construction‐Action Theory for different reasons to deceive

Exploring the decision component of the Activation‐Decision‐Construction‐Action Theory for different reasons to deceive

Relational surprise experiences as a unique form of relational maintenance

Truth Bias and Partisan Bias in Political Deception Detection

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