When expertise backfires: Contrast and assimilation effects in persuasion

Bohner, Gerd; Ruder, Markus; Erb, Hans‐Peter

doi:10.1348/014466602321149858

Cited by 114 publications

(93 citation statements)

References 38 publications

(79 reference statements)

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“…We chose this fictitious issue because the corresponding message arguments had already been extensively pre-tested and used in prior studies on biassed processing (Bohner et al, 2002;Erb et al, 1998). Moreover, a fictitious issue was assumed to prevent other factors (e.g.…”

Section: Stimulus Materialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both models hold that under certain conditions the processing of information relevant to the issue under consideration (termed central route and systematic processing, respectively) can be biassed by factors exogenous to the message like source characteristics (e.g. Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 2002;Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994), recipients' mood states (Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi 1994; Petty, Schuman, Richman, & Strathman, 1993), consensus among proponents (Darke et al, 1998;Erb, Bohner, Schmälzle, & Rank, 1998), and others (e.g. Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996;Ziegler, von Schwichow, & Diehl, 2005).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Biassed processing of persuasive information: on the functional equivalence of cues and message arguments

Erb

Pierro

Mannetti

et al. 2007

Euro J Social Psych

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Research on persuasion has shown that inferences based on heuristic or peripheral cues can bias the subsequent processing of persuasive messages. Two studies (total N ¼ 296) examined the additional possibilities that a message argument can serve as a biassing factor and cue-related information can serve as the target of processing bias. It was demonstrated that a message argument can bias (a) the processing of subsequent other message arguments (Study 1) and (b) the processing of subsequent cue information (Study 2). Results are discussed within dual-process models and the recently developed unimodel of persuasion. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Significant improvements in our understanding of how people form and change attitudes in response to persuasive communication have been accomplished by dual-process models of persuasion, namely Petty and Cacioppo's 'Elaboration Likelihood Model' (ELM; e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and Chaiken and colleagues' 'Heuristic-Systematic Model' (HSM; e.g. Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). Both models hold that under certain conditions the processing of information relevant to the issue under consideration (termed central route and systematic processing, respectively) can be biassed by factors exogenous to the message like source characteristics (e.g. Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 2002;Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994), recipients' mood states (Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi 1994; Petty, Schuman, Richman, & Strathman, 1993), consensus among proponents (Darke et al., 1998;Erb, Bohner, Schmälzle, & Rank, 1998), and others (e.g. Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996;Ziegler, von Schwichow, & Diehl, 2005). Within this framework, the present article explores previously European Journal of Social Psychology Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1057-1075(2007 According to both the ELM and the HSM, biassed processing reflects an effect of some peripheral or heuristic factor on the valence of cognitive responses toward message content and subsequent attitude judgement. For example, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) observed that cognitive responses toward a message on a telephone answering machine were more positive when the communicator was perceived to be of high credibility (a magazine specialized in scientific product testing) versus low credibility (a promotional pamphlet of a discount department store chain). The effect occurred when (a) recipients were sufficiently able and motivated to process the persuasive message thoroughly and (b) the message itself was neither clearly weak nor strong, but sufficiently ambiguous to allow the biassing factor to contort its content. Biassed cognitive responses to the message, in turn, led to favourable or unfavourable attitude judgements toward the consumer product. The assumed underlying mechanism was that heuristic-based initial pre-judgements, positive (negative) in the case of a highly credible (incredible) source, coloured the valence of cognitive responses that recipients finally based their judgements on (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994, p. 461). Biassed processin...

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Section: Stimulus Materialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Biassed processing of persuasive information: on the functional equivalence of cues and message arguments

Erb

Pierro

Mannetti

et al. 2007

Euro J Social Psych

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“…Esta condição permitiu, por exemplo, argumentar que em condições de elevada elaboração os indivíduos também podem ver as suas atitudes afectadas pelas pistas de contexto, através do seu impacto indirecto, por mediação dos pensamentos desencadeados face à mensagem. Apesar de raros, alguns estudos (e.g., Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 2002) recorrem apenas ao uso da mensagem fraca como condição experimental, esperando encontrar diferenças nas reacções a estes argumentos entre os indivíduos que elaboram o seu conteúdo e aqueles que o não fazem.…”

Section: Variações Do Paradigmaunclassified

Dissociação de modos de processamento em persuasão

Garcia‐Marques

Silva

Loureiro

2013

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ResumoNeste artigo, apresentamos o paradigma subjacente à dissociação dos processos de mudança atitudinal (mudança por via central vs. periférica) Em 1981 Richard Petty e John Cacioppo realizam uma revisão dos estudos que até então tinham abordado a questão da mudança de atitude. Nesta obra os autores procuram explicar uma série de resultados aparentemente distintos e por vezes contraditórios sobre o efeito de diferentes variáveis na promoção de mudança de atitudes em contexto persuasivo. Os autores sugerem que estes resultados podem ser explicados ao se considerar que a mudança de atitude pode ocorrer por duas vias distintas: uma via central e uma via periférica (ver modelo ELM adiante 1 ). Mudanças ocorrem por uma via central quando se caracterizam pela extensiva ponderação das qualidades do objecto atitudinal e argumentos que sustentam Laboratório de Psicologia, 10(2): 205-221 (2012 Dissociação de modos de processamento em persuasãoTeresa Garcia-Marques Pedro P. Silva Filipe Loureiro ISPA -Instituto UniversitárioNota do autor: Este trabalho foi realizado como parte dos trabalhos do projecto PTDC/PSI-PCO/121925/2010 financiado pela FCT -Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia. A correspondência relativa a este artigo deverá ser enviada para: Teresa Garcia-Marques,

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“…First, it is worth noting that source characteristics are assumed to create expectancies regarding message validity (Chaiken et al, 1989). That is, recipients may find it more likely that a certain position is valid when it is advocated by a credible source (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994), by an expert source (Bohner et al, 2002), or when it is supported by a majority (Erb et al, 1998) as compared to when the same position is favoured by a source low in credibility, expertise, or supported only by a minority. Thus, bias is seen as resulting from an expectancy-consistent elaboration of an ambiguous message in the direction of cue valence.…”

Section: Biased Processing As a Function Of Source-recipient Combinatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is politician A or politician B more persuasive? recipients' source preference and the direction of biased message processing

Ziegler

Diehl

2003

Euro J Social Psych

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Participants' preference for one of two politicians running for the post of Chancellor in Germany was measured. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, participants were then presented with a persuasive message ascribed to one of these two sources. The message was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. Different from previous research on the role of message ambiguity for attitude change, the ambiguous message consisted of arguments rated as moderately convincing in a pretest rather than of a mixture of strong and weak arguments. The results were in line with predictions derived from the heuristic-systematic model (HSM). Indicating unbiased systematic processing, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message. In the case of an ambiguous message, in line with the HSM's bias hypothesis, more agreement was found among participants preferring the source politician as compared to participants preferring the other politician. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Disagreement over the question of whether someone has made a convincing point with respect to a certain topic is probably an experience all of us have had on various occasions. Consider, for example, a politician who was interviewed on a certain policy. You were quite convinced and express your agreement with the politician's position in a conversation with your colleague. As it turns out, however, your colleague was not convinced at all that the position advocated by the politician was valid. On the other hand, your colleague was quite persuaded by a similar statement by another politician on the same topic that you found rather unconvincing. In still other cases, you and your colleague are in agreement with respect to whether these politicians' statements seem to provide compelling evidence for a certain policy or not.On a more abstract level, the question arising from this example is how we might be able to explain that there is agreement between two recipients of a persuasive communication in certain cases but disagreement in others? In particular, the question of interest here is why a message delivered by a source A might result in more persuasion for some recipients than for others but quite the opposite is true in the case of source B? We propose that-under circumstances to be described in more detail below-such effects may be understood from the perspective of the heuristic-systematic model

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When expertise backfires: Contrast and assimilation effects in persuasion

Cited by 114 publications

References 38 publications

Biassed processing of persuasive information: on the functional equivalence of cues and message arguments

Biassed processing of persuasive information: on the functional equivalence of cues and message arguments

Dissociação de modos de processamento em persuasão

Is politician A or politician B more persuasive? recipients' source preference and the direction of biased message processing

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