When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners’ dilemma game?

Dai, Yu; Lü, Peng

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2015.07.030

Cited by 64 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…In the heterogeneous conformity environment, the high-reputation individuals with the positive conformity tag contributed more to promoting cooperation than low-reputation individuals with the positive conformity tag. Moreover, if individuals were positive conformists, heterogeneous reputations could promote cooperation, and a moderate ratio of high-reputation to low-reputation individuals could amplify this effect, which is consistent with our previous article [25]. If individuals' conformity tags were negative, homogeneous reputations could promote cooperation.…”

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confidence: 89%

How do reputation and conformity promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma?

Liu

Wang

Dai

2022

EPL

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In evolutionary games, many mechanisms have been proposed to promote cooperation between individuals and the heterogeneity of these mechanisms has been widely investigated. However, the joint effects and heterogeneity of multiple mechanisms have not been adequately studied. Here, we introduce different neighborhoods and global tags to denote different reputation and conformity types, respectively, and discuss the joint effects and heterogeneity of reputation and conformity mechanisms on promoting cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Simulation results show that the joint effects of reputation and conformity mechanisms can promote cooperation effectively and the heterogeneity of these two mechanisms promotes cooperation only in certain circumstances.

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confidence: 89%

How do reputation and conformity promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma?

Liu

Wang

Dai

2022

EPL

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“…For instance, in the indirect reciprocity model, a donor examines the reputation of a potential recipient to decide whether or not to donate [52][53][54][55]. Other studies have indicated that reputation also affected imitative behavior in strategy updating and an individual would be more willing to imitate the strategies of others with good reputations [56][57][58][59]. Some scholars have explored the effects of reputation on public investment behavior [60,61].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Quan¹,

Guo²,

Wang³

2022

J. Stat. Mech.

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The historical behavior of a defector in a group is usually considered in the determination of the intensity of the punishment to be applied to the defector. Because exclusion is a more severe form of punishment, we introduce a conditional punishment that allows punishers to choose between traditional punishment and exclusion. The specific form of punishment is chosen to fit the specific reputation of the defector. A good reputation garners a traditional milder punishment, such as a fine, whereas a bad reputation merits exclusion. The historical behaviors of the individuals in a group are recorded to evaluate their reputations. Those whose reputations fall below a designated threshold are regarded as bad. We study the effects of reputation thresholds, fines, enhancement factors, and exclusion costs on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games. Simulations show that higher thresholds are more conducive to the evolution of cooperation. An extremely small enhancement factor can induce individuals to cooperate when the threshold is relatively high. Cooperation also appears with smaller enhancement factors for higher fines or lower exclusion costs. These results may expand our understanding of how these two strategies of punishment promote cooperation.

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“…In addition, five rules for the evolution of cooperation which are kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection, were reviewed by Nowak [35] in 2006, interpreting the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma. Furthermore, a large amount of mechanisms facilitating cooperative behaviors have been proposed in recent years' studies, such as reputation, [36][37][38][39] social norms, [40][41][42][43][44][45] rewards, [46][47][48][49][50] and punishments, [51][52][53][54] teaching ability, [55] environment, [56][57][58] aspiration, [59,60] memory, [61,62] interference of noise, [63] selfinteraction, [64] external forcing, [65] decoy effect, [66] to name but a few.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Benefit community promotes evolution of cooperation in prisoners’ dilemma game*

Wang

et al. 2019

Chinese Phys. B

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Exploring the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma is valuable and it arises considerable concerns of many researchers. In this paper, we propose a mechanism to promote cooperation, called benefit community, in which cooperators linking together form a common benefit community and all their payoffs obtained from game are divided coequally. The robustness of conclusions is tested for the PDG (prisoners’ dilemma game) on square lattice and WS small world network. We find that cooperation can be promoted by this typical mechanism, especially, it can diffuse and prevail more easily and rapidly on the WS small world network than it on the square lattice, even if a big temptation to defect b. Our research provides a feasible direction to resolve the social dilemma.

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When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners’ dilemma game?

Cited by 64 publications

References 57 publications

How do reputation and conformity promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma?

How do reputation and conformity promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma?

Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Benefit community promotes evolution of cooperation in prisoners’ dilemma game*

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