2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8551.2011.00737.x
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When Cooperation is the Norm of Appropriateness: How Does CEO Cooperative Behaviour Affect Organizational Performance?

Abstract: The current study has tested the prediction that CEO cooperative behaviour has an impact upon organizational performance. This is a fundamental organizational issue that is in clear need of illumination through studies of practice. We pursued the issue through a study of leadership in organizations located in the Norwegian socio-cultural context in which cooperation has been, and still is, a norm of appropriateness. The study provided empirical evidence of a positive relationship between CEO cooperative behavi… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 48 publications
(57 reference statements)
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“…Their findings show that larger pay gaps in variable (fixed) pay promote (inhibit) greater numbers of patents of better quality. They claim that high dispersion in variable pay is more closely related to individual effort, thereby encouraging effort, coordination and good team dynamics among top executives (Espedal et al, 2012). In contrast, high dispersion in fixed pay is highly likely to trigger affective conflicts, and discourage executives from exerting effort or cooperating, as well as from sharing knowledge (e.g.…”
Section: Formal Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Innovationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Their findings show that larger pay gaps in variable (fixed) pay promote (inhibit) greater numbers of patents of better quality. They claim that high dispersion in variable pay is more closely related to individual effort, thereby encouraging effort, coordination and good team dynamics among top executives (Espedal et al, 2012). In contrast, high dispersion in fixed pay is highly likely to trigger affective conflicts, and discourage executives from exerting effort or cooperating, as well as from sharing knowledge (e.g.…”
Section: Formal Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Innovationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Handlingsrommet påvirkes også av en leders kompetanse, motivasjon og forståelse. Den enkelte fortolker forventninger, krav og strukturelle føringer, noe som vil prege opplevelsen av muligheter og begrensninger for handling i ethvert handlingsrom (Espedal, Kvitastein & Grønhaug, 2012). Tilnaermet identiske fenomener kan forstås som begrensninger eller muligheter av ulike yrkesutøvere, fordi regler kan gis alternative fortolkninger.…”
Section: Handlingsromunclassified
“…Studien tyder på at når lederne benytter sitt subjektive handlingsrom, kan det vaere mulig å få til en balansert pendling mellom fag, administrasjon og andre ledelsesfaglige identiteter (Sørensen, 2006). Hvordan ledere definerer sitt subjektive handlingsrom, viser seg å vaere viktig for de valgene og handlingene ledere foretar Espedal, 2009;Espedal, Kvitastein & Grønhaug, 2012), noe som også fremkommer i vår studie.…”
Section: Ledelse Og Bruk Av Handlingsromunclassified
“…While there are multiple channels that could connect beauty to excellence (e.g. Halford and Hsu, 2020), good-looking CEOs do not necessarily make optimal decisions (Espedal et al, 2012). On one hand, CEO facial attractiveness is associated with risky financial policies (e.g.…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%