What We Owe to Family: The Impact of Special Obligations on Moral Judgment

McManus, Ryan M.; Kleiman-Weiner, Max; Young, Liane

doi:10.1177/0956797619900321

Cited by 105 publications

(118 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…If observers infer greater selfish motivations for actors' behavior when it signals more attractive traits, then generosity's being more attractive than impartiality to potential interaction partners may account for our results. It would not be surprising if the strength of social norms and the attractiveness of interaction partner traits were correlated, though there might also be interesting moderators of this association, such as relational obligations (McManus, Kleiman-Weiner, & Young, 2020). There might be interesting cases where These explanations are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, and future work may dissociate their contributions to differential virtue discounting across generosity and impartiality, and other virtues (Graham et al, 2011).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential discounting of virtue signaling: Public virtue is perceived less favorably than private virtue for generosity but not impartiality

Kraft‐Todd¹,

Kleiman-Weiner²,

Young³

2020

Preprint

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There is a paradox in our desire to be seen as virtuous. If we do not overtly display our virtues, others will not be able to see them; yet, if we do overtly display our virtues, others may think that we do so only for social credit. Here, we investigate how virtue signaling works across two distinct virtues—generosity and impartiality—in eleven online experiments (total N=4,586). We demonstrate the novel phenomenon of differential virtue discounting, revealing that participants perceive actors who demonstrate virtue in public to be less virtuous than actors who demonstrate virtue in private, and, critically, that this effect is greater for generosity than impartiality. Further, we provide evidence for the mechanism underlying these judgments, showing that they are mediated by perceived selfish motivations. We discuss how these findings and our novel terminology can shed light on open questions in the social perception of reputation and motivation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential discounting of virtue signaling: Public virtue is perceived less favorably than private virtue for generosity but not impartiality

Kraft‐Todd¹,

Kleiman-Weiner²,

Young³

2020

Preprint

Self Cite

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show abstract

“…For example, side-taking is an essential part of being a good friend, and research has shown that people react negatively towards a friend who remains neutral as much as towards a friend who is against them (Shaw, DeScioli, Barakzai, & Kurzban, 2017). Additionally, agents who helped strangers instead of kin are judged as less morally good and trustworthy (McManus, Kleiman-Weiner, & Young, 2020).…”

Section: Egocentric Evaluations Are Strategicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Egocentrism shapes moral judgements

Bocian

Baryla

Wojciszke

2020

Social & Personality Psych

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We review past and recent literature on how egocentrism shapes moral judgements. We focus on mechanisms by which egocentric evaluations appear to people as objective, impartial and morally right. We also show that people seem to be unaware of these biases and suggest that understanding how egocentrism impacts moral judgements demands studying morality embedded in a specific social context rather than the social void created in a laboratory. Finally, we argue that egocentric biases in moral judgements are not easily overcome and persist even if people deliberately try to omit attitudes in their judgements or if morally relevant information is present. We conclude that egocentric evaluations triggered by such factors as personal and group interests or attitudes may lay at the core of moral judgements of others because they help maintain a strategic social and personal relationships. 1 | INTRODUCTION We don't see things as they are, we see them as we are (Anaïs Nin, 1961). People experience the world through their preferences, values, background and expectations. For all the richness of our experience, however, the perspective of others cannot be felt: to infer what others might think, we need effort and careful deliberation. While our unique point of view is easily and automatically accessible, the perspective of others is attainable only in favourable conditions in terms of motivation and cognitive resources.

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“…For instance, an evidence-based belief may be morally bad because it constitutes a form of disloyalty towards one's friends or family (of whom one is supposed to think well; c.f. Cohen & Rozin, 2001;Keller, 2004;McManus, Kleiman-Weiner, & Young, 2020;Stroud, 2006). Alternatively, as some philosophers have argued, making race-or sex-based inferences may fail to treat minorities with due respect, even when they are based on evidence (e.g., Basu, 2019; but see Gardiner, 2018).…”

Section: The Case For Moral Encroachment On Belief Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief

Cusimano¹,

Lombrozo²

2020

Preprint

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When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e.g., that one’s friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday situations, people treat moral considerations as legitimate grounds for believing propositions that are unsupported by objective, evidence-based reasoning. We further document two ways in which moral evaluations affect how people prescribe beliefs to others. First, the moral value of a belief affects the evidential threshold required to believe, such that morally good beliefs demand less evidence than morally bad beliefs. Second, people sometimes treat the moral value of a belief as an independent justification for belief, and so sometimes prescribe evidentially poor beliefs to others. Together these results show that, in the folk ethics of belief, morality can justify and demand motivated reasoning.

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What We Owe to Family: The Impact of Special Obligations on Moral Judgment

Cited by 105 publications

References 40 publications

Differential discounting of virtue signaling: Public virtue is perceived less favorably than private virtue for generosity but not impartiality

Differential discounting of virtue signaling: Public virtue is perceived less favorably than private virtue for generosity but not impartiality

Egocentrism shapes moral judgements

Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief

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