Differential discounting of virtue signaling: Public virtue is perceived less favorably than private virtue for generosity but not impartiality

Abstract

There is a paradox in our desire to be seen as virtuous. If we do not overtly display our virtues, others will not be able to see them; yet, if we do overtly display our virtues, others may think that we do so only for social credit. Here, we investigate how virtue signaling works across two distinct virtues—generosity and impartiality—in eleven online experiments (total N=4,586). We demonstrate the novel phenomenon of differential virtue discounting, revealing that participants perceive actors who demonstrate virtue in public to be less virtuous than actors who demonstrate virtue in private, and, critically, that this effect is greater for generosity than impartiality. Further, we provide evidence for the mechanism underlying these judgments, showing that they are mediated by perceived selfish motivations. We discuss how these findings and our novel terminology can shed light on open questions in the social perception of reputation and motivation.

Psychological Science in the Wake of COVID-19: Social, Methodological, and Metascientific Considerations

“…To maintain a good reputation, people behave more prosocially when their behavior is observable (Kraft-Todd et al, 2015; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006). Social-media posts causing moral expansion may need to communicate costly behaviors rather than mere speech (Kraft-Todd et al, 2018), given that failing to do so may be perceived as virtue-signaling (Jordan & Rand, 2019; Kraft-Todd et al, 2020). Meanwhile, increasing concern about online virtue-signaling (e.g., Jordan & Rand, 2019; Kristofferson et al, 2013) incites disapproval of moral hypocrites (Jordan et al, 2017).…”

Psychological Science in the Wake of COVID-19: Social, Methodological, and Meta-Scientific Considerations

“…To maintain a good reputation, people behave more prosocially when their behavior is observable (Kraft-Todd et al, 2015;Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006). Social media posts causing moral expansion may need to communicate costly behaviors, rather than mere speech (Kraft-Todd et al, 2018), as failing to do so may be perceived as virtue signaling (Jordan & Rand, 2019;Kraft-Todd et al, 2020). Meanwhile, increasing concern about PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19 30 online virtue signaling (e.g., Jordan & Rand, 2019;Kristofferson et al, 2013) incites disapproval of moral hypocrites (Jordan et al, 2017).…”

“…Meanwhile, increasing concern about PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19 30 online virtue signaling (e.g., Jordan & Rand, 2019;Kristofferson et al, 2013) incites disapproval of moral hypocrites (Jordan et al, 2017). As the majority of social behavior remains online, psychologists may deepen our understanding of moral cognition by considering how the observability of one's own behavior shapes social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and how perceptions of virtue-signaling may motivate others' behaviors (Kraft-Todd et al, 2020).…”

Practice what you preach: Credibility-enhancing displays and the growth of open science

“…We then argue that the second challenge to spreading OSPs is their non-normativity, summarizing studies which demonstrate that despite growing support for the movement (Tenopir et al, 2015), OSPs remain uncommon (Hardwicke et al, 2020). Taken together, these data suggest a third challenge to spreading OSPs: the temptation to engage in dishonest virtue signaling (Kraft-Todd, Kleiman-Weiner, & Young, 2020). We then summarize the challenges facing the spread of OSPs before discussing the logic of our solution leveraging the theory of credibility-enhancing displays (Henrich, 2009).…”