People's motivational states--their wishes and preferences--influence their processing of visual stimuli. In 5 studies, participants shown an ambiguous figure (e.g., one that could be seen either as the letter B or the number 13) tended to report seeing the interpretation that assigned them to outcomes they favored. This finding was affirmed by unobtrusive and implicit measures of perception (e.g., eye tracking, lexical decision tasks) and by experimental procedures demonstrating that participants were aware only of the single (usually favored) interpretation they saw at the time they viewed the stimulus. These studies suggest that the impact of motivation on information processing extends down into preconscious processing of stimuli in the visual environment and thus guides what the visual system presents to conscious awareness.

Do stimuli appear to be closer when they are more threatening? We tested people's perceptions of distance to stimuli that they felt were threatening relative to perceptions of stimuli they felt were disgusting or neutral. Two studies demonstrated that stimuli that emitted affective signals of threat (e.g., an aggressive male student) were seen as physically closer than stimuli that emitted affective signals of disgust (e.g., a repulsive male student) or no affective signal. Even after controlling for the direct effects of physiological arousal, object familiarity, and intensity of the negative emotional reaction, we found that threatening stimuli appeared to be physically closer than did disgusting ones (Study 2). These findings highlight the links among biased perception, action regulation, and successful navigation of the environment.

People tend to view members of their own political group more positively than members of a competing political group. In this article, we demonstrate that political partisanship influences people's visual representations of a biracial political candidate's skin tone. In three studies, participants rated the representativeness of photographs of a hypothetical (Study 1) or real (Barack Obama; Studies 2 and 3) biracial political candidate. Unbeknownst to participants, some of the photographs had been altered to make the candidate's skin tone either lighter or darker than it was in the original photograph. Participants whose partisanship matched that of the candidate they were evaluating consistently rated the lightened photographs as more representative of the candidate than the darkened photographs, whereas participants whose partisanship did not match that of the candidate showed the opposite pattern. For evaluations of Barack Obama, the extent to which people rated lightened photographs as representative of him was positively correlated with their stated voting intentions and reported voting behavior in the 2008 Presidential election. This effect persisted when controlling for political ideology and racial attitudes. These results suggest that people's visual representations of others are related to their own preexisting beliefs and to the decisions they make in a consequential context. bias ͉ psychology ͉ race ͉ voting ͉ Barack Obama

Although people assume that they see the surrounding environment as it truly is, we suggest that perception of the natural environment is dependent upon the internal goal states of perceivers. Five experiments demonstrated that perceivers tend to see desirable objects (i.e., those that can fulfill immediate goals-a water bottle to assuage their thirst, money they can win, a personality test providing favorable feedback) as physically closer to them than less desirable objects. Biased distance perception was revealed through verbal reports and through actions toward the object (e.g., underthrowing a beanbag at a desirable object). We suggest that seeing desirable objects as closer than less desirable objects serves the self-regulatory function of energizing the perceiver to approach objects that fulfill needs and goals.

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Two studies demonstrated that the motivation to resolve cognitive dissonance affects the visual perception of physical environments. In Study 1, subjects crossed a campus quadrangle wearing a costume reminiscent of Carmen Miranda. In Study 2, subjects pushed themselves up a hill while kneeling on a skateboard. Subjects performed either task under a high-choice, low-choice, or control condition. Subjects in the high-choice conditions, presumably to resolve dissonance, perceived the environment to be less aversive than did subjects in the low-choice and control conditions, seeing a shorter distance to travel (Study 1) and a shallower slope to climb (Study 2). These studies suggest that the impact of motivational states extends from social judgment down into perceptual processes.

Emerging demonstrations of the malleability of distance perception in affective situations require an organizing structure. These effects can be predicted by approach and avoidance orientation. Approach reduces perceptions of distance; avoidance exaggerates perceptions of distance. Moreover, hedonic valence, motivational intensity, and perceiver arousal cannot alone serve as organizing principles. Organizing the literature based on approach and avoidance can reconcile seeming inconsistent effects in the literature, and offers these motives as psychological mechanisms by which affective situations predict perceptions of distance. Moreover, this perspective complements functional models of perception claiming perceptions of distance serve adaptive responding, and in so doing suggests why perceptions of distance respond to affective situations. This review contributes to the building of a broader theory of motivated distance perception.

Why do some people demand harsher legal punishments than do others after viewing the same video evidence? We predict that inconsistent patterns of punishment decisions can be reconciled by considering the simultaneous effects of social group identification and visual attention. We tested 2 competing predictions--the attention unites and attention divides hypotheses--to understand whether visual attention exaggerates or eliminates differences in legal decision making as a function of social identification with outgroups. We measured social identification with police (Studies 1a, 1b) or manipulated identification with a novel outgroup (Study 2). Participants watched videos depicting physical altercations in which the targets' culpability was ambiguous. We surreptitiously tracked (Studies 1a, 2) or manipulated (Study 1b) visual attention to outgroup targets. Results support the attention divides hypothesis. Among participants who fixated frequently on outgroup targets, prior identification influenced punishment decisions. This relationship did not emerge among participants who fixated infrequently on the target. Subjective interpretations of and accurate recall for targets' actions mediated the relationship between identification and attention on punishment. We discuss implications for bias in legal decision making and policy.